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REVITALIZING THE QUIET NINTH AMENDMENT:
DETERMINING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS AND
EliMINATING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Christopher J. Schmidtt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Do people have a constitutional right to clone themselves? Does an
individual have a constitutional right to receive health care? One day,
these issues may be adjudicated in the United States' federal court
system, most likely the United States Supreme Court, but what constitutional provision will govern the dispute? Under current law, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment determines if the
liberty interest contained therein encompasses the proposed right.
The text of the Constitution, however, requires that the Ninth Amendment govern whether the people retain an unenumerated right.
Part I of this article discusses the development of the substantive
due process doctrine. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have
parallel provisions preventing the federal and state governments, respectively, from denying "life, liberty, and property without due process of law."1 The substantive due process doctrine turns due process
from a mechanism ensuring procedural fairness when the government attempts to deny life, liberty, or property, into a fourth protected entity that determines whether or not fundamental rights exist
that are not enumerated within the Constitution. Under the doctrine,
due process has some "substantive" quality that forms and then falls
under the liberty provision. It is this judicial creation, void of textbased constitutional support, that has provided unpredictable legal
standards and results because it can be bent to meet any ends necessary. However, this inconsistency can be easily eradicated by applying
the text of the Ninth Amendment to determine unenumerated rights
issues.
Sparse analysis of the Ninth Amendment by both courts and scholars makes it difficult to determine where Ninth Amendmentjurisprudence stands. The Ninth Amendment states that "[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."2 In contemporary constitu-
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tional discussions, the analytical process generally requires sifting
through a tremendous amount of material to reach a result. The
Ninth Amendment is almost the direct opposite. Until 1965, only
about ten Supreme Court cases mentioned the Ninth Amendment,
and no case has relied on it as an exclusive or primary rule in its decision. 3 The spark igniting the Ninth Amendment debate arose from
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 in
which he found a right to privacy to exist under the amendment. 5
That opinion created a slight commotion in legal circles. Since then,
the Ninth Amendment received serious attention as a possible source
for protecting individual rights within the Constitution. 6 The scholarly interest in the amendment fostered some intense and disputatious bursts of intellectual discourse. 7 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has sparingly applied the Ninth Amendment, and the
substantive due process standard remains in full effect. 8 Therefore,
the time is right to sort through this body of material and develop a
clear understanding of the Ninth Amendment with an appropriate
test to analyze whether or not certain actions or behaviors are recognizable as unenumerated rights, while eliminating the judicially created substantive due process doctrine.
Part II of this article examines the text of the Ninth Amendment.
The plain meaning of the amendment sanctions its authority to adjudicate whether an unenumerated right exists warranting constitutional recognition. This contradicts current jurisprudence adopting a
substantive due process component in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The language of the Ninth Amendment cannot be contradicted or
supported by any attempt to analyze what the amendment's drafter,
James Madison, thought the amendment means. His alleged view,
which we cannot be sure of, cannot trump the text of the amendment.
Because the text itself is so important, relying on the Founders' intent,
particularly on Madison, to support conclusions about the Ninth
Amendment's meaning is a dangerous fallacy. The one document the
Founders agreed upon was the text of the Ninth Amendment. That
text governs unenumerated rights, not what a modern-day scholar
thinks Madison thought the Ninth Amendment meant. Because the
3. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69
IND. LJ. 759,761 (1994).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Id. at 486-87.
6. See generally Gregory Allen, Ninth Amendment and State Constitutional Rights,
59 ALB. L. REv. 1659, 1660 (1996) (citing Russell L. Caplan, The History
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, in RANDY E. BARNETr, THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 243 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989)).
7. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
US. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw.
U.L. REv. 550, 622-23 (1992).
8. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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Ninth Amendment grants the people unenumerated rights, the judiciary has a duty to recognize them when federal or state governments
infringe upon those rights. 9 That is not a form of judicial activism
because the Constitution grants the people unenumerated rights;
thus, the judiciary has a duty to recognize and protect them from unconstitutional infringement. Natural law principles, the virtually undisputed philosophical backdrop of the Founders, and the
Constitution, further support an interpretation of the Ninth Amendment granting the people rights not expressly enumerated elsewhere
in the Constitution. 10
I evaluate unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment interpretive paradigm listed above. My approach flows from the text of the
Ninth Amendment and blends the original meaning of the text with
current norms to determine if a proposed unenumerated right warrants constitutional recognition. If a preponderance of the evidence
shows the proposed right deserves constitutional protection, it will be
considered an unenumerated right and be free of government regulation absent a narrowly tailored, compelling government interest. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows the proposed right does not
deserve constitutional protection, it will not be considered an
unenumerated right and the federal government can regulate it if it is
rationally based on a legitimate government interest. This stable, textbased approach will eliminate the flawed substantive due process test
and provide more consistent and credible standards and results.
Part III of this article explains problems in the traditional reading
of the Ninth Amendment. That approach ignores the plain meaning
of the Ninth Amendment for a structural interpretation of its content.
This view proposes that the Ninth Amendment only ensures that the
rights enumerated in the first eight amendments are protected from
the federal government's limited powers. This contradicts the Ninth
Amendment's express grant of unenumerated rights retained by the
people. The traditional approach also neglects to apply the Ninth
Amendment against the states, although as a portion of the Bill of
Rights it is a privilege and immunity of citizenship that no state can
abridge under the Fourteenth Amendment. II
State constitutional provisions adopting language mirroring the
Ninth Amendment prove that the traditional reading of the Ninth
Amendment is inaccurate. If the traditional approach is correct, and
the Ninth Amendment forever places a line between federal rights
and powers, thereby leaving the remaining power to the states, then
why does any state need to repeat that proclamation in its state constitution? Because the majority of states adopt a Ninth Amendment like
9. See Allen, supra note 6, at 1662.
10. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also infra Part II.B.
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declaration, we know that the amendment grants the people rights
that were not mentioned in the Constitution. Therefore, state constitutions following that mantra directly protect their citizens by granting them unenumerated rights not present in their state constitutions.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND NINTH AMENDMENT
LAW

A.

The Development of Substantive Due Process Law

In Lochner v. New York,12 an owner of a bakery was convicted under a
New York state law that prohibited employers from requiring or allowing their employees to work in excess of a sixty hour work week, or
more than ten hours a day.13 The Court overturned the conviction
finding that entering into an employment contract was a substantive
right under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted a protected
liberty interest. 14 The Court's legal trick turned the procedural command of the Due Process Clause - that life, liberty, or property could
not be taken without sufficient procedural safeguards - into a substantive form of due process wherein unenumerated rights could be
based. Is
The Court's assertion that the right to enter into an employment
contract was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was inaccurate
because the amendment does not explicitly provide for such a protection. I6 The Court "manufactured a constitutional right ... out of its
substantive formulation of due process."17 The decision, devoid of a
textual foundation, stands as a startling example of judicial intervention into the political choices of the legislature; thus, it serves as a
cautionary tale of the inappropriate exercise of judicial power. lS Lochner effectively immortalized the substantive due process mechanism
that is still the standard for analyzing claims regarding unenumerated
constitutional rights today. 19
12. 198 U.S. 45, 46 n.l (1905).
13. Marc C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due
Process A nalysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 85, 144 (2000)
(citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46 n.l).
14. Id. at 145 (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57).
15. Id. The precise birth of substantive due process is difficult to ascertain. Its
origin may be Dred Scott v. Sanford, 313 U.S. 236 (1857) (noting that a slave
who went to a free state was not free upon return to the slave state). The
Court read into the Constitution the legality of slavery forever and denied
the federal and state governments from preventing slavery. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCrION OF THE LAw 32
(Collier MacMillan 1990).
16. Id. at 145.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 146 (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
19. Niles, supra note 13, at 145 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
719-36 (1997)) (" [A] pplying substantive due process analysis in determining that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.").
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Mter Lochner, substantive due process inappropriately developed
into "the primary textual basis for recognizing or rejecting
'unenumerated' fundamental rights."20 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 2I the
Court struck down a Nebraska statute preventing instructors from
teaching students foreign languages before a student passes eighth
grade. 22 The Court concluded that individuals have "certain fundamental rights which must be respected."23 In so doing, the Court held
that the right of the instructor to teach, and the parent's right to obtain instruction for their child was within the liberty component of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 24 The words of the Court's opinion show
the illogical nature of substantive due process. 25 A fundamental right
of the instructor and parents was at stake, not necessarily their lib20. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 56
(1995). As noted in the Fleming's article, the following cases adopt the
substantive due process analysis to determine if an unenumerated or fundamental right exists: West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) ("liberty of conscience and freedom of thoughn; Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) ("freedom of association,
including both expressive association and intimate association"); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("right to live with one's
family, whether nuclear or extended"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
629-30 (1969) ("right to travel or relocate"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
95-96 (1987) ("right to marry"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
("right to marry"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("right
to procreate"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("right
within marital association to use contraceptives"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("right of individual, married or single, to use contraceptives"); Careyv. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) ("right
to distribute contraceptives"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
("right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy"); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) ("reaffirming 'central holding' of Rne"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923) ("right to direct
the education of children"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) ("right to direct the upbringing and education of children"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990) ("right to bodily integrity, in
particular, to avoid unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs");
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) ("right to bodily integrity,
in particular, to be protected against the extraction of evidence obtained by
'breaking into the privacy' of a person's mouth or stomach"); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("assuming for
purposes of the case a 'right to die"'); Id. at 339-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("arguing that decisions about death are a matter of individual conscience"); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) ("right of
privacy includes both an 'individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters' and an 'interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions"'); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("right
to receive ideas and to be free from unwanted government intrusions into
the privacy of one's home"). Id. at 7 n.27
21. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22. [d. at 400.
23. [d. at 401.
24. [d. at 400.
25. [d. at 399-400.
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erty.26 If an unenumerated right is at issue, then the Ninth Amendment governs the adjudication of that legal claim. 27 In Pierce v. Society
of the Sisters of the Holy Names,28 the Court invalidated an Oregon statute requiring parents and/or guardians of children to send them to
public schoo1. 29 The Court stated that "rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged"30 and "those who nurture [a child] and
direct his destiny have the right ... to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."31 Although unenumerated rights were at issue, the Court followed Meyer and based its decision on the liberty
component of the Due Process Clause. 32 A Connecticut statute
preventing the use of contraceptive devices and preventing medical
advice related to using those devices was not substantively addressed
by the Court in Poe v. Ullman. 33 The Court dismissed the plaintiff's
declaratory judgment action because the statute had not been enforced and there was no realistic fear of future prosecution. 34
As the Warren Court began to address more fundamental rights issues, it first curtailed its own power to review legislative enactments.
In Ferguson v. Skrupa,35 the Court upheld a Kansas statute that authorized only lawyers to engage in debt adjustment. 36 The Court affirmed
its full step back from Lochner-type decisions, announcing that it would
not strike down laws that it finds are unreasonable, unwise, or incompatible with some economic or social philosophy.37 The Court recognized that states have the ability to legislate "so long as their laws do
not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of
some valid federal law."38 The Court appropriately returned to the
original constitutional proposition, in which it does not substitute its
own beliefs for the judgment of the legislature. 39
Eliminating the "super-Iegislature"4o position of the Court in Lochner-type substantive due process claims returned the Court to a textually definitive starting point for substantive due process issues - or did
26. Meyer, 262 u.s. at 400.
27. If the Court determined that an enumerated right existed under the Ninth
Amendment, the right would have applied against Nebraska through the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 535.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 534-35.
33. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
34. Id. at 508-09.
35. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 729-30.
38. Id. at 730-31 (quoting Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)).
39. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730.
40. Id. at 731.
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it? The Court only addressed its inability to overturn otherwise constitutional statutes that were unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought. 41 The Court did not address a
return to the constitutional underpinnings of un enumerated rights
issues found in the Ninth Amendment. That foundation, if properly
laid, would have to come in Griswold v. Connecticut. 42
B.

The Ninth Amendment Affirmatively Enters the Substantive Due Process
Analysis

The hallmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut forever intertwined substantive due process and Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. At issue
before the Court was the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that
prohibited the use or assistance in use of contraceptive devices. 43 The
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it "concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."44 The decision concluded, "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."45 The Court found that various guarantees in the Constitution create zones of privacy, such as the right of association in the First
Amendment, the right to prohibit the quartering of soldiers in homes
in times of peace in the Third Amendment, the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the
right against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the
Ninth Amendment. 46
The Court's mention of the Ninth Amendment as support for its
conclusion that a marital zone of privacy exists creates a confusing
form of reasoning. The Court enunciates the specific rights held
under the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments that create a
zone of privacy.47 However, it only quotes the text of the Ninth
Amendment; it does not explain what right under the Ninth Amendment helps mold the zone of privacy recognized. 48 Furthermore, the
Court does not explain or state anything else in reference to the
Ninth Amendment. Its text is left dangling before the curious
reader's eyes as though awaiting some explanation. The reason no
explanation exists is because the Court cannot give one. It cannot
explain how the Ninth Amendment can support recognizing a zone of
privacy under the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment
41. Id. at 731-32 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955».
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id. at 480.
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id. at 484.
46. Id.
47. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
48. Id.
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because the text and meaning of the Ninth Amendment precludes
that conclusion. The specific guarantee under the Ninth Amendment
is that the people retain unenumerated rights. 49 Therefore, the Ninth
Amendment recognizes the zone of privacy that encompasses a marital couple's choice to use contraceptive devices. The Ninth Amendment
is an authoritative source g;uaranteeing the zone of privacy, not a persuasive
source supporting the constitutional recognition of a zone of privacy through a
provision of another amendment.
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion,joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, supports the right of marital privacy through
precedent and the language and history of the Ninth Amendment. 5o
Justice Goldberg caught the majority's curt mention of the Ninth
Amendment as well and explained that his opinion will "add ... words
to emphasize the relevance of that amendment to the Court's holding."51 He argued that "[t]he language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that
there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."52
While Justice Goldberg fell into the all-too-familiar trap of relying on
James Madison's alleged intent behind the Ninth Amendment, he
posited the first substantial judicial body of work advocating a Ninth
Amendment adjudication of unenumerated rights issues. 53 He concluded that:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deeprooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may
be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many
words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not protected by the Constitution because it is not
mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the
Ninth Amendment, which specifically states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."54

49. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.").
50. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg,j., concurring).
51. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, j., concurring).
52. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, j., concurring).
53. Id. at 490-91.
54. [d. at 491-92 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
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As a breakthrough opinion, Justice Goldberg hedged on the limits
of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. He did not proclaim enough of
an authoritative Ninth Amendment jurisprudence to evaluate
unenumerated rights claims. In addition, he conceded too much and
inaccurately provided, "I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is applied against the states by the Fourteenth."55
To ensure, however, that unenumerated rights receive protection
from state infringement, the Ninth Amendment must be applied
against the states. While it must be admitted that the Bill of Rights was
only intended to protect citizens against federal intrusion, and that
the states had the ability to determine how they would protect individual liberties, 56 the incorporation doctrine - holding that particular
portions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - is a fictional judicial creation. The Court's selective incorporation of some, but not
all, rights to the states, creates a slot machine theory where some
rights are in and some are OUt. 57 The Ninth Amendment has never
been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. 58 But the
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, states that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States .... "59 That clause is "meant to
do the work of incorporation."6o The clause "is an 'eminently reason55. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg,]., concurring).
56. See generally Sanders, supra note 3, at 774-75; Laurence G. Sager, You Can
Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth
Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 239, 245 (1988)
(noting that the Bill of Rights only restricted the federal government, it did
not restrict the States); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the
'Jurisprudence of Original Intent," 74 GEO. LJ. 1719, 1730 (1986) (noting that
most commentators agree that the Ninth Amendment was originally meant
to apply to the federal government).
57. Sanders, supra note 3, at 775 (citing Justice Frankfurter in HENRY]. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 57 (4th ed. 1982». A list of the rights incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
found in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
58. Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and its Implications for
State Constitutional Law, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1229,1250 (1990).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Unfortunately, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is virtually insignificant in constitutional law. Currently, the privileges and immunities of state citizens are not intended to have any additional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872). Privileges and immunities "owe their existence to the federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or
its laws." Id. at 79. Thus, the Court essentially deleted the Privileges and
Immunities Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment. Akhil Reed Amar,
The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26, 123 n. 327 (2000).
60. Sanders, supra note 3, at 777 (citing MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Duke
Univ. Press 1986) and Robert]. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism
in the E,ra of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863 (1986»;
see also Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Un-
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able way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall
apply to the States.' "61 The Bill of Rights provisions are obviously privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; thus, they are
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 The Privileges and
Immunities Clause commands that no State can lessen, diminish or
impair these rights, which include unenumerated rights under the
Ninth Amendment. 63 Recognizing the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as the incorporation mechanism establishes credibility in the
incorporation doctrine and undermines, if not eliminates, the troubling concept of substantive due process. 64 Precluding the application
of the Ninth Amendment directly to the states would eliminate a
Ninth Amendment only jurisprudence, rendering the Ninth Amendment merely persuasive, and not a dispositive law regarding
unenumerated rights issues. This fails to follow the text of the amendment itself, leaving intact the flawed substantive due process doctrine.
Courts would still use the Ninth Amendment as support, along with
other portions of the Bill of Rights, to determine whether a fundamental right exists. Furthermore, courts would then likely follow the
inaccurate precedent established and apply the right against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A

61.

62.

63.

64.

real Differences, 22 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 102 (1987) (stating that the
substantive due process decisions "might better have been cast in terms of
'privileges' or 'immunities' of national citizenship" under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael Conant,
Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: SlaughterHouse Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785, 819 (1982) ("These privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States are found in the original
Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, and in English constitutional protections
of 1791 preserved by the Ninth Amendment.").
Sanders, supra note 3, at 777 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 166 (Black, j.,
concurring) ); see also Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application Against the States, 44 U. FLA. L. REv. 219, 223 (1992)
("The Privileges or Immunities Clause would provide a simRle and direct
textual basis for application of the Bill of Rights to the states.' ); Amar, supra
note 59, at 124 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Bill of Rights against the states).
Sanders, supra note 3, at 777. Sanders cites Senator Jacob Howard's view
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects fundamental guarantees
from state intrusion to support his conclusion. Id. at 776 (citing CONGo
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866)). I agree with Sanders' conclusion, however, I reject using a legislator'S view of what a constitutional
amendment means when interpreting that amendment. See infra Part III.A
&C.
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1,21 (1996). Text, context, history, ethical aspirations, precedent and constitutional structure suggest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed to make the
Constitution a guarantee of liberty. Id. at 2 (providing a full account of the
meaning, history, and interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
Sanders, supra note 3, at 779.
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Ninth Amendment only jurisprudence to determine whether an
unenumerated right exists follows the Constitution's text, as does applying that unenumerated right against the states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
entirely text-based apparatus streamlines the jurisprudence through a
credible constitutional foundation that eliminates the ability of judges
to inaccurately alter the issue before them to reach a legal result that
does not conform to constitutional language.
Next, the Ninth Amendment, as a separate constitutional provision,
must be recognized as an independent source of rights. Justice
Goldberg denied that the "[N]inth [A]mendment constitutes an independent source of rights."65 He concluded there is no textual basis
for reading the Amendment that way.66 Reading the Ninth Amendment as an independent source of rights does not mean that the
Ninth Amendment creates rights. It simply recognizes unenumerated
rights retained by the people. Accordingly, those rights must be independent of the enumerated rights already existing in the text of the
remainder of the Constitution. Justice Goldberg's complimentary
view of the Ninth Amendment concluded: "[T]he Ninth Amendment
simply lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments."67 The Ninth Amendment,
however, is the textually prescribed amendment to adjudicate whether
or not an unenumerated right exists. Its text does not indicate, nor
infer, that it is a complimentary doctrine to aid the Court in determining whether or not a fundamental right exists under the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment, rather, recognizes that there are fundamental personal rights that are protected from government abridgement although they are not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution. 68 Justice Goldberg need only go that far. He appropriately ended his analysis with, "in sum, I believe that the right of privacy
in the marital relation is fundamental and basic - a personal right 'retained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment."69 There is no reason to curtail the reading of the Ninth
Amendment by expanding upon that pronouncement. Allowing the
Ninth Amendment to be the sole arbiter of unenumerated rights is"

65. Mitchell, supra note 58, at 1731 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,492 (1965)(Goldberg,j., concurring)).
66. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1731.
67. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, j., concurring) (citing United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,94-95 (1947) ("The right ofa citizen to act
as a party official or worker to further his own political views ... [is contained in the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments] .").
68. [d. at 496 (Goldberg, j., concurring).
69. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, j., concurring).
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sues is not legislating from the bench, it is the constitutional commandment of its text.
Justice Black refurbished, if not created, the textually inaccurate
traditional approach to Ninth Amendment jurisprudence in his dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stewart. 70 Justice Black concluded
there is no right to privacy written in the Constitution and that the
Court should stick to the simple language of amendments when construing them. 71 However, he failed to heed his own warning and ignored the text of the Ninth Amendment. He rejected the idea that
judges can determine whether or not state law violates fundamental
principles ofliberty and justice or is contrary to the people's traditions
and collective conscience. 72 He incorrectly stated that "one would ...
have to look far beyond the language of the Ninth Amendment to find
that the Framers vested in this Court any such awesome veto powers
over lawmaking, either by the States or by the Congress."73 The language of the amendment declares that the people retain unenumerated rights. As Justice Black admitted, under Marbury v. Madison,14 the
United States Supreme Court "has constitutional power to strike down
statutes, state or federal, that violate commands of the Federal Constitution."75 It is an open and shut case then. The plain meaning of the
Ninth Amendment announces that the people retain unenumerated
rights. The holding of Marbury sanctions the Court to strike down
state or federal law violating a portion of the federal Constitution. 76 If
we follow the simple words of the amendment and Marbury, how can
we not recognize that the Court has to be the arbiter of unenumerated
rights issues? Because Justice Black had no text on which to stand, he
used a non-textual historical analysis. He proclaimed that the purpose
of the Ninth Amendment was to assure the people that the Constitution would limit the federal government to its expressly granted powers or those developed from necessary implication.77 If that is what
the Ninth Amendment means, why does its text not say that or something somewhat similar?
Justice Black suggested that allowing judges to determine
unenumerated rights would create a "day-to-day constitutional convention."78 That is inaccurate because the text of the Ninth Amend70. See generally id. at 507-27 (Black,]., dissenting).
71. See id. at 508-09 (Black,]., dissenting).
72. [d. at 518-19 (Black,]., dissenting).
73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black,J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
75. Griswold, 381 U.S at 513 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (l
Cranch) at 177-78.
76. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78.
77. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black,]., dissenting); see also id. at 530 (Stewart,].,
dissenting) ("[TJhe Federal Government was to be a government of express
and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to it were
retained by the people and the individual States.").
78. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
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ment commands that the people retain unenumerated rights; thus,
they warrant constitutional protection from all three branches of government. The amendment creates a degree of uncertainty since
rights not enumerated are protected. If a judge granted an
unenumerated right constitutional protection without the presence of
the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution, that would be judicial activism. Since the text mandates that the people retain unenumerated
rights, a judicial mechanism protecting them from unconstitutional
infringement is constitutionally necessary. Justice Black feared that
authorizing judges to strike down laws under the Ninth Amendment
because they are "unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational" would blur the separation of powers in government and reduce states' rights. 79 The Ninth Amendment's text does not allow a
judge to strike down a law for those reasons; thus, that fear is unfounded. The Court may only recognize an unenumerated right retained by the people.
C.

The Ninth Amendment and Substantive Due Process Since Griswold

1.

Recent Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence

Unfortunately, the textually erroneous substantive due process doctrine has grown much like Pinocchio's nose. However, the unsound
nature of the doctrine has met judicial resistance. While the United
States Supreme Court still follows the doctrine when determining
unenumerated rights issues, it has alluded to the weak foundation and
applicability of the doctrine, thereby leaving a window of opportunity
for the Ninth Amendment to reenter the constitutional landscape and
shut the door on substantive due process.
In Roe v. Wade,80 the Court ruled that a woman has a right to privacy, including a qualified right to terminate a pregnancy, under the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.81 The Court
found the roots of the right to privacy in the text and case law of the
First Amendment,82 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,83 the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,84 the Ninth Amendment,85 and the concept
79.
80.
8l.
82.

See id. at 52l.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[d. at 153.
[d. at 152 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). In Stanley,
the right of privacy protected a citizen's private possession of obscene matter from criminal culpability. 394 U.S. at 559.
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, j., dissenting); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886)).
84. Rne, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965)) .
85. [d. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, j., concurring)).
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of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment. 86 Astonishingly, that smorgasbord of amendments, decisions, and legal principles, from numerous portions of the Constitution, made it clear to the Court that only
personal rights considered fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty are part of the guarantee of personal privacy.87 The
Court's reliance on varying decisions, from separate constitutional
provisions, to find a right of privacy shows substantive due process's
non-textual foundation. The Court can rely on a panoply of majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions addressing different legal issues,
to determine the scope of the right to privacy. This system allows the
Court to reach as far and wide as needed to find support for its holding. That type of judicial stretching at least begs credibility to the
question of whether the Court is acting as another legislature. Furthermore, the Court need not, and should not, follow a judicially
crafted yellow brick road to recognize an un enumerated right. Adjudicating unenumerated rights through the Ninth Amendment would
establish standards and case law to evaluate those concerns, thereby
strengthening the jurisprudence through specific textual and case law
driven guidelines. Consequently, the folly of searching for an analogy
to buttress recognition of a fundamental right becomes unnecessary.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,88 the Court invalidated a city housing ordinance restricting the family members available to reside in a
dwelling to only a few categories of related individuals. 89 The Court
concluded that substantive due process protects the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life. 90 The decision
conceded that substantive due process has been a treacherous field,
with numerous risks present when the Court grants substantive liberties without the guidance of a specific portion of the Bill of Rights. 91
The Court admitted that Lochner-type decisions foster caution and restraint; however, it refused to abandon substantive due process. 92
This is a perfect example of the Court recognizing its substantive due
process dilemma, while still holding true to it, instead of reverting to
the text and meaning of the Ninth Amendment. That reversion
would provide a specific portion of the Bill of Rights to invalidate the
city ordinance, thereby decreasing the level of risk, caution, and restraint present when determining unenumerated rights issues.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,93 the Court upheld a Georgia statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy.94 The decision narrowly framed
86. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

u.s.

390, 399 (1923)).
u.s. 319, 325 (1937)).

87. Id. (quoting in part Palko v. Connecticut, 302
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 496, 499.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 502.
Id.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 189.
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the issue, questioning whether there is a right to engage in homosexual sodomy, not whether the actions were protected privacy rights. 95
The Court found the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was not a
fundamental liberty implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or a
liberty that was deeply rooted in the country's history and tradition. 96
The Court continued to acknowledge substantive due process's loose
foundation by concluding:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the process by which life, liberty, or
property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses
have been interpreted to have substantive content, subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal
or state regulation or proscription. 97
Once again, the Court took notice of the textual problem it faced
when applying the substantive due process doctrine, but the Court
continued to sanction the doctrine's use without a look to the text of
the Ninth Amendment to solve the problem.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,98 the Court upheld a California statute
that presumes a child born to a married couple is a product of that
relationship, thereby excluding a person outside the marriage from
establishing paternity to the child. 99 The decision reiterated the problematic nature of substantive due process,100 and focused its principles
on (1) the interests society traditionally protects lOl that are (2) so
rooted in the people's traditions and conscience to be ranked as fundamental. 102 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,103 the Court affirmed the
core holding of Roe and retreated from the ardent historical and traditional analysis for a more flexible standard. The decision determined
that due process has not been reduced to any formula; thus, its content cannot be determined by reference to any code.104 Also, the
Court concluded freezing due process at some fixed stage of time or
95. Id. at 190. The United States Supreme Court is expected to rule in Lawrence
v. Texas, whether a Texas statute punishing homosexual sodomy is
constitutional.
96. Id. at 191-92 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26; Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 497, 506 (1965).
97. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
98. 491 U.S. llO (1989).
99. See id. at 131-32.
100. See id. at 121-22.
101. Id. at 122.
102. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)).
103. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
lO4. Id. at 849 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (opinion dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
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thought suggests that constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges. 105
In Washington v. Glucksberg,106 the Court upheld a Washington law
preventing physician-assisted suicide.107 The decision provides a return towards a more historical and traditional review of substantive
due process, while at the same time still criticizing the doctrine itself.
The weak and flawed substantive due process doctrine 108 is exposed:
[T] he Court has "always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this uncharted area are scarce
and open-ended." By extending constitutional protection to
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent,
place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,"
lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of
this Court....
. . . We have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed." Second, we have required in substantivedue-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for
responsible decision making," that direct and restrain our
exposition of the Due Process Clause. 109
Troxel v. GranvilU? 10 gave the Court another opportunity to utilize
the Ninth Amendment. Instead it, "invoked the nonmammalian
whale of substantive due process, a phantasmagorical beast conjured
up by judges without clear textual warrant."111 The Court relied on
Meyer and Pierce to conclude a Washington state statute allowing visitation rights to persons other than a child's custodial parents violated a
mother's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of her children. 112
[d. at 850 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952».
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
[d. at 735.
Niles, supra note 13, at 135.
[d. at 136 (quoting Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997)
(citations omitted).
110. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
111. Amar, supra note 59, at 122-23.
112. 530 U.S. at 65-67.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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A few weeks after Troxel, in Stenberg v. LeRoy,113 the Court had another chance to right its substantive due process wrong. The Court
began its opinion with a sentence that should have called its attention
to the Ninth Amendment: "We again consider the right to an abortion."1l4 Because an unenumerated right, abortion, was considered,
the amendment concerning unenumerated rights, the Ninth, should
have governed the case. Instead, the Court followed substantive due
process precedent in Roe and Casey and determined a Nebraska statute
criminalizing certain partial birth abortions was unconstitutional. 115
While the standards of substantive due process continue to fluctuate, a more restrictive evaluation has generally been adopted. Formerly, the Court considered whether an asserted unenumerated
fundamental right was "'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty,' '>116 or was required by a "'principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'117 Now the Court considers only whether the alleged right has
historically been protected against governmental interference. 1 IS
Before the change, the Court inquired into traditions as if they were
principles in which to aspire to, allowing for more development and
progression. llg Mter the change, the Court now inquires into traditions as if they were narrowly conceived historical practices. I20
The topsy-turvy nature of recent substantive due process methodology seems to conform to the result needed, depending upon which
ideological block forms a majority. It has become based on more tradition and history, thereby, limiting the recognition of rights, while
still expanding to contain more flexible and evolving principles when
recognizing the existence of a fundamental right. These inconsistent
analytical means undoubtedly promote the possibility of judicial legislation due to substantive due process's lack of a textual origin.
2.

Recent Ninth Amendment Jurisprudence

As you might expect, the Ninth Amendment's role in modern jurisprudence is still largely irrelevant. A few post-Griswold cases, however,
113. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
114. [d. at 920 (emphasis added).
115. [d. at 929-30. Justice Scalia discussed the Ninth Amendment in his dissent.
For analysis of his opinion see infra Part I1.C.2.
116. Fleming. supra note 20, at 57 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S 319,
325 (1937»; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
117. Fleming. supra note 20, at 57 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (citations
omitted) ).
118. [d. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986».
119. [d.
120. [d.
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have mentioned the Ninth Amendment. 121 Justice Douglas is largely
responsible for post-Griswold Ninth Amendment jurisprudence and
has become a pseudo-pioneer of recognizing Ninth Amendment
rights. In Palmer v. Thompson,122 the Court upheld a city's decision to
close racially segregated swimming pools, rather than keeping them
open and integrated. 123 Justice Douglas opined:
My conclusion is that the Ninth Amendment has a bearing
on the present problem.
The "rights" retained by the people within the meaning of
the Ninth Amendment may be related to those "rights"
which are enumerated in the Constitution.
There is, of course, not a word in the Constitution, unlike
many modern constitutions, concerning the right of the people . . . to recreation by swimming or otherwise. Those
rights, like the right to pure air and pure water, may well be
rights "retained by the people" under the Ninth Amendment. May the people vote them down as well as Up?124
In Doe v. Bolton,125 Justice Douglas concluded that Ninth Amendment rights include customary, traditional, and time honored rights,
amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within the "the Blessings of Liberty" mentioned in the Constitution's preamble. 126 He
blends his Ninth Amendment jurisprudence with substantive due process by adding that many Ninth Amendment rights are within the
meaning of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment. 127 In Lubin v.
Parrish, 128 Justice Douglas announced that "the right to vote in state
121. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,210 (1975) (Douglas,]., concurring); Lubin
v. Parrish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974) (Douglas,]., concurring); Palmerv.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233 (1971) (Douglas,]., dissenting).
122. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
123. [d. at 219.
124. [d. at 233-34 (Douglas,]., dissenting); see also Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas,]., dissenting) (quoting Griswold's mention
of the Ninth Amendment as a source for the right of privacy); Olff v. E.
Side Union High Sch. Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), em. denied, 404
U.S. 1042, 1043 (1972) (Douglas,]., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(noting that a school student's hair style is a fundamental right retained
under the Ninth Amendment); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (lath Cir.
1971), em. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas,]., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (dissenting for the same reasons as stated in the Olffdissent.).
125. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
126. [d. at 210 (Douglas,]., concurring); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 714 (1972) (Douglas,]., dissenting) (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 254 ("The Second
through the Ninth Amendments limit the powers ... in order that due
regard shall be paid to the private 'rights of the governed.''')).
127. Doe, 410 U.S. at 210-11 (Douglas,]., concurring).
128. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
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elections is one of the rights ... 'retained by the people' by virtue of
the Ninth Amendment as well as included in the penumbra of First
Amendment rights."129
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,130 the Court used the Ninth
Amendment to support the finding that the First Amendment contains a right of the press to attend criminal trials. 131 The Court's sojourn into the Ninth Amendment is largely irrelevant because the
amendment was inappropriately used as a rule of construction, rather
than an explicit guarantee of the right. 132 This approach is similar to
the Griswold majority's curt mention of the Ninth Amendment as support for its finding of a right to privacy applied through the substantive due process doctrine. 133
As discussed above, Troxel concluded a Washington state statute allowing visitation rights to persons other than a child's biological parents violated the biological mother's fundamental right to bring up
her children under a substantive due process methodology.134 Justice
Scalia's dissent concluded the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children was an unalienable right proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and an unenumerated right under the
Ninth Amendment. 135 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia dropped the ball
by concluding that the Constitution did not entitle him to deny legal
effect to laws he views infringe upon what he considers an unenumerated right. 136 However, the Constitution provides "the supreme Law
of the Land"137 and Justice Scalia is "bound by Oath or Affirmation"138 to support the Constitution; thus, he must uphold and apply
the Ninth Amendment. To determine that an unenumerated right
exists that cannot be abridged, and then to allow a legislature to
abridge that right, nullifies the right and places the legislature above a
co-equal branch of government, the judiciary. 139
129. [d. at 721 n.*.
130. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
131. [d. at 579-80; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (Goldberg,]., concurring) ("The integrity of the family unit has found protection in [the Ninth
Amendment] .").
132. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1732.
133. See id. at 1732-33.
134. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
135. [d. at 91 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
136. [d. at 92.
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
138. [d.
139. For two other non-substantive due process views on Troxel see Amar, supra
note 59, at 123 (pointing out that Justice Scalia ignores the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as constitutional text limiting state power to restrict unspecified, fundamental freedoms); Troxe~ 530 U.S. at 80 n. * (Thomas,].,
concurring) (declining to reevaluate whether substantive due process cases
contradict the original understanding of the Due Process Clause and
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Troxel's cursory discussion of the Ninth Amendment, along with
Stenberg not mentioning it a few weeks later, left Ninth Amendment
jurisprudence essentially where it has been for a while. The Court
does not use the Ninth Amendment as a tool for incorporating independent unenumerated rights or as an independent source of rights;
instead, the Ninth Amendment incorporates certain rights unenumerated but related to those enumerated - into the Bill of
Rights. 140 These incorporated rights are then applied against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 141
D.

The Elimination of Substantive Due Process Law

Regardless of what interpretative school of thought a legal scholar is
in, there should be little debate that the creation of "substantive due
process" in the Fourteenth Amendment is a judicial leap. How can
due process have a substantive element? The Constitution provides no
textual basis for substantive due process. 142 The Fourteenth Amendment states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process oflaw."143 The amendment does not
contain the word "substantive" before the words "due process." As
John Hart Ely noted, "'there is simply no avoiding the fact that the
word that follows 'due' is 'process.' [W]e apparently need periodic
reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms
sort of like 'green pastel redness.' "144 Substantive due process is a
paradoxical, oxymoronic phrase that "'has been inflated into a
patched and leaky tire on which precariously rides the load of some
substantive human rights not named in the Constitution.' "145 Due
process simply requires that the substance of any law be applied to a
person through fair procedures by any tribunal hearing the case.146
The clause does not say anything about what the substance of the law
must be. 147 The meaning of the Due Process Clause's words, and their
natural implications, do not guarantee substantive rights. 148 Due process prevents the government from doing certain things to people

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

147.
148.

whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause is incorrectly interpreted because those issues were not argued).
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1731.
Id.
Niles, supra note 13, at 91 (citing CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 3 (Penguin Putnam Books
1997)).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3441 (1980).
Niles, supra note 13, at 136 n.162 (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 3).
Bruce N. Morton, John Locke, Robert Bark, Natural Rights and the Interpretation
of the Constitution, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 709,756 (1992) (quoting BORK,
supra note 15, at 31).
Id.
Niles, supra note 13, at 91 n.20 (citing BLACK, supra note 142, at 3).
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without fair procedures. 149 The clause does not state what things may
or may not be done. lso For example, the Due Process Clause prevents
a person from being tried before a bribed judge, or from being tried
without being informed of the charge against them. ISI It could not
prevent an unbribed tribunal from convicting a defendant in a procedurally fair trial for marrying at age thirty-nine under a state statute
setting the minimum age to marry at forty. 152 Changing due process
from a procedural protection to a quality being protected is not a
small step, but one giant leap for judge-kind. By applying substantive
due process, "[t]he Court has attempted to fit square pegs into round
holes, by forcing rights that might properly be protected by the broad
. language of the [N]inth [A]mendment into constitutional provisions
where no amount of pushing can comfortably make them fit."153
Therefore, the lack of textual support for fundamental rights protected under substantive due process, and the corresponding reliance
on tradition and fundamentality to restrict the doctrine, result in a
weak and unsatisfactory mechanism for the protection of personal
freedom. 154 Marc C. Niles adopted Charles L. Black, Jr.'s view concerning substantive due process's deficiencies by stating:
[The application of substantive due process] follows no
sound methods of interpretation (how could it, given the nature of the phrase itself?) and is therefore neither reliably
invocable in cases that come up, nor forecastable in result by
anything much but a guess. This kind of non-standard is not
good enough for a systematic equity of human rights. It
everlastingly will not do; it is infra dignitatem, it leaks in the
front and leaks in the back.155
The substantive due process doctrine's lack of textual constitutional
support persuades judges to limit the scope of rights granted under it.
Conservative jurists ascribed to this ironic rights-limiting view of the
rights-expanding substantive due process doctrine as a mechanism
for identifying and protecting only those rights or liberties that have a
Morton, supra note 146, at 756 (quoting BaRK, supra note 15, at 180).
Id.
Niles, supra note 13, at 91 n.20 (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 2).
Id. (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 2-3).
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1727; see also Jason S. Marks, Beyond Penumbras
and Emanations: Fundamental Rights, The Spirit of the Revolution, and the Ninth
Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CaNST. LJ. 435, 482 (1995) (noting that the
Ninth Amendment appears to be a stronger textual basis than the Fourteenth Amendment for unenumerated rights.).
154. Niles, supra note 13, at 137; see also Derrick Alexander Pope, A Constitutional
Window to Interpretive Reason: or in Other Words . .. The Ninth Amendment, 37
How. LJ. 441, 458 (1994) ("[A]ny reliance upon the Due Process Clause to
identify substantive rights is ill-advised.").
155. Niles, supra note 13, at 91 n.19 (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 3).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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firm foundation in the murky legal, historical, moral or ethical tradition of Britain or the United States. 156
The need to find some form of judicial restraint causes the Court to
rely on "'tradition to decide whether a right deserves protection
under the Due Process Clause."'157 The need for some restraint on
substantive due process - necessary because of the doctrine's lack of a
textual foundation that would otherwise provide an effective limitation - results in its great failure as a mechanism to protect individual
privacy rights and check illegitimate government power. 158 This restriction identifies a limited sphere of personal autonomy primarily
because it requires individuals to demonstrate that what they intend
to do is so fundamental and sacrosanct in the English speaking
world's history that any government attempt to regulate the activity
should be closely scrutinized. 159
When the Court defines fundamental liberties that are not mentioned in the Constitution, it must act with more caution or become
susceptible to criticism that it is imposing its own controversial choices
of value upon the people. 160 If the Court were to determine
unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment, as opposed to
fundamental liberties through substantive due process's ever changing sources, a textual foundation would be laid in this area ofjurisprudence decreasing judicial caution and public criticism because the
judiciary would be acting under constitutionally prescribed authority
instead of whimsical notions of judicial creativity.161
III.

A.

THE MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

The Ninth Amendment's Text

It is well known that "[t]he interpretation of any written law must
begin with its text."162 A Constitutional analysis begins with the "constitutional text speaking to ... [the] precise question."163 Accordingly,
"[ t] he text itself is an obvious starting point of legal analysis. Is it even
156. [d. at 138 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 293-94
(Scalia,]., concurring».
157. [d. at 139 (quoting Anthony C. Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep'S Clothing?: A
Critical Analysis ofjustice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2246 (1996».
158. [d. at 140.
159. [d.
160. Tribe, supra note 60, at 105 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coil. of Obstetricians, 476 U.S 747, 790 (1986) (White,]., dissenting».
161. See also Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1727 ("The decisions the Court's critics
find most objectionable might be more textually defensible if premised
frankly on the principle embodied in the [N] inth [A] mendment - that the
scop~ of the Constitution in protecting individual rights is broader than its
text. ).
162. [d. at 1721; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land).
163. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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possible to deduce the spirit of a law without looking at its letter?"164
Therefore, a reading of the Ninth Amendment is the first step in revitalizing it. The Ninth Amendment states, "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."165 As one commentator noted:
It seems clear from the language of the [N]inth
[A]mendment that certain rights exist even though they are
not enumerated in the Constitution, that these rights are retained by the people, and that by express command these
unenumerated rights are not to be denied or disparaged by
any governmental body. It is also a generally accepted truism that "[i] t cannot be presumed that any clause in the
[C]onstitution is intended to be without effect.... " "... [A]s
no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none
should suffer subordination or deletion."166
164. Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 CEO. WASH. L. REv.
1143, 1143 (1998).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
166. Jordan]. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form ofGuarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231, 237 (1975); see also Barnett, infra note 182, at
3, 42 (noting that the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights
retained by the people); Bitensky, supra note 7, at 623 (noting that straightforward reading of Ninth Amendment means that the enumeration of
rights in the Constitution must not be interpreted to preclude future recognition of unenumerated rights in the Constitution); David M. Burke, The
"Presumption of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal
Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARv.].L. & PUB.POL'y 73, 128 (1994)
("The Ninth Amendment['s] [language] commands that the enumeration
of the rights in the first eight Amendments 'shall not be construed to deny
or disparage' those rights, too numerous to describe specifically, 'retained'
by the people."); Phoebe A. Haddon, An Essay on the Ninth Amendment: Interpretation for the New World Order, 2 TEMP. POL. & ClY. RTS. L. REv. 93, 93
(1992) ("The text, on its face seems to support the argument that the rights
protected by the Constitution are not limited to its express provisions.");
Stephen D. Hampton, Sleeping Giant: The Ninth Amendment and Criminal
Law, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 349, 349 (1991) ("[T]he Ninth Amendment establishes United States citizens have unenumerated rights, rights not listed in
the Constitution."); Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory
ofJudicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REv. 343, 368 (1981) (noting that the Ninth
Amendment's text recognizes unenumerated rights); Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 305,
343 (1987) (noting that the Ninth Amendment preserves "fundamental
rights that were not enumerated in the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution"); Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1742 ("[T]he Ninth
Amendment commands broad incorporation of the individual rights that
the Constitution was intended to protect."); Randall R. Murphy, The Framers' Evolutionary Perception of Rights: Using International Human Rights Norms as
a Source for Discovery of Ninth Amendment Rights, 21 STETSON L. REv. 423, 447
(1992) (noting that the meaning of the Ninth Amendment's words "seems
to be that not all rights retained are enumerated in the Constitution");
Pope, supra note 154, at 450 ("The Ninth Amendment recognizes that, in
the realm of human existence and development, there are potentially more
rights and privileges than the Constitution can bear to enumerate."); Sager,
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This straightforward interpretation of the Ninth Amendment has
the distinct virtue of construing the amendment's words for just what
they seem to say.167 The Ninth Amendment's message, "as plain as
one might hope for given the vagaries of language, that the specification of some rights was not to be interpreted as denying the equal
presence within the legal system of other, enumerated rights."168
Even if the Ninth Amendment's language is considered vague, '" [i] tis
rare ... that even the most vague and general text cannot be given
some precise, principled content - and that is indeed the essence of
the judicial craft.' "169
The Ninth Amendment prescribes that there are unenumerated
rights retained by the people and a reading of other constitutional
rights cannot be used to deny or even disparage the unenumerated
rights retained by the people. 170 The amendment, at first glance, appears to be a failsafe. In case a right retained by the people was not
enumerated, that does not preclude the recognition of that right.
Originalist judges and scholars, supposedly committed to an original understanding of the Ninth Amendment, skip the text of it and
jump to the secondary components of legal analysis to find their answer. 17I These sources include historical understanding and practice,
the Constitution's structure, and the jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court. 172 These sources are only invoked to answer a
constitutional question when there is "no constitutional text speaking
to [the] precise question."173 However, originalists, who advocate
strict adherence to the explicit language of the Constitution and condemn the judicial practice of protecting privacy rights that have no

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

supra note 56, at 242 (noting that unenumerated rights, not explicitly manifest in liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution, enjoy the same status
as those made explicit in the text.); Sanders, supra note 3, at 761 (noting
that the text of the Ninth Amendment contemplates unenumerated rights
besides those specifically listed elsewhere); Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth
Amendment, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 597, 617 (1991) (noting that the Ninth
Amendment was adopted to ensure unenumerated rights would be protected). Compare with Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack? 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 67, 79 (1988) (stating that a
liberal reading of the Ninth Amendment recognizing unenumerated rights
suggests the Constitution's openness to justice). But see Michael McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
89,109 (1988) ("Open-ended judicial review-the doctrine of un enumerated
rights-threatens to cut short the very process of 'open-minded and publicspirited' deliberation upon which moral realism depends.").
Bitensky, supra note 7, at 623.
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.KENT L. REv. 131, 141 (1988).
Burke, supra note 166, at 123 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1183 (1989».
Morton, supra note 146, at 751.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
Id.
Id.
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specific textual basis,174 do not follow the text of the Ninth Amendment. Robert Bork proposed this alleged originalist view. 175 He
argued:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you
know something of what it means. For example, if you had
an amendment that says "Congress shall make no" and then
there is an inkblot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and
that is the only copy you have, I do not think the Court can
make up what might be under the inkblot. 176
Bork believes that when "original understanding is lost, or cannot
be established with sufficient confidence," judges should refrain from
working because there is nothing to work with.177 Unfortunately for
Bork, "[ t] here is no inkblot after the words 'The enumeration in the
Constitution.' We have the full text of the sentence."178 This is a perfect example of the non-original originalist argument against recognizing that the Ninth Amendment grants the people rights not
enumerated in the Constitution. When compared with some of the
language and punctuation of the rest of the Constitution, the Ninth
Amendment is a rather straightforward and clear pronouncement.
To deny that its original meaning grants the people unenumerated
rights is not an originalist position.
The Ninth Amendment's meaning cannot be compromised by peripheral legal arguments. While a strong smoke screen can be established through these positions, one need look no further then the text
of the amendment to dissipate the cloud of smoke. A brief reading of
the amendment leads to a simple and obvious conclusion - individuals retain unenumerated rights outside the enumerated rights in the
Constitution. Unless the Ninth Amendment is repealed or altered
through a constitutional amendment, courts have a duty to give full
effect to its terms. 179
Originalists, critics of a Ninth Amendment jurisprudence authorizing the recognition of unenumerated rights, "ignore the implications
of the ... amendment and thus depart from their own stated commit174. Geoffrey G. Slaughter, The Ninth Amendment's Role in the Evolution of Fundamental Rightsjurisprudence, 64 IND. LJ. 97, 98 (1988).
175. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 791.
176. Sanders, supra note 3, at 791 (quoting Robert H. Bork, The BorkDisinjvrmers,
WALL ST.]., Oct. 5,1987, at 22).
177. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 477, 535-36 (1998) (citing
BaRK, supra note 15, at 166).
178. Sanders, supra note 3, at 791.
179. Burke, supra note 166, at 122. The Constitution, including the Ninth
Amendment, may be amended. See U.S. CaNST. art. V. Until that occurs,
federal judges are bound by oath or affirmation to uphold the Ninth
Amendment. U.S. CaNST. art. VI.
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ment to constitutional text and original intent."180 Because the Ninth
Amendment was intended to point toward enforceable fundamental
rights that exist apart from the text, originalists who deny these rights
exist have to resort to a non-originalist foundation for their constitutional theory. 181 When originalists abandon their methodology only
when considering the Ninth Amendment, they may reach their desired result of greatly limiting the scope of constitutional rights, but
only at the price of maintaining a consistent originalist methodology.182 The Ninth Amendment's plain meaning is an embarrassment
to originalists and their political agenda. 183 Originalists are "compelled . . . to assert that the amendment does not mean what it
says .... "184 Therefore, originalists like Bork are left to make personally held philosophical and policy based arguments, instead of following the language and history of the Constitution. 185 Ultimately, the
Ninth Amendment's existence serves as proof that originalists fatally
misread the Bill of Rights' purpose and role. 186
The Ninth Amendment provides the appropriate balance between
complying with the Constitution's text and providing an evolving form
of jurisprudence. Texts limit, even if they do not precisely define, the
interpretations that can be reasonably offered for them and the legal
fictions that they can generate. 187 The Ninth Amendment acknowledges these restrictive problems and suggests that the Constitution is
capable of adapting to societal change. 188 We must remember, however, that the power of the Ninth Amendment to evolve through interpretation is granted from its text. 189 This concept seems illogical in
some legal circles. Generally, textualists rely "on a fixed view of the
meaning of a law based on how it was believed to have been interpreted at the time of its adoption."19o This stance overly restricts legal
thought and analytical growth by positing that'" [t] he text of the document and the original intention of those who framed it would be the
judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitution."'1 91 Liberals argue for analytical development, but do so without pointing to a tex180. Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1215 (1990) (citing Levinson, supra note 168, at 13435).
181. Id.
182. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
32 (1988).
183. Morton, supra note 146, at 751.
184. Id. at 751.
185. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 608.
186. Id. at 609.
187. Tejshree Thapa, Expounding the Constitution: Legal Fictions and the Ninth
Amendment, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 139, 141 (1992).
188. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1723.
189. Thapa, supra note 187, at 161.
190. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1724.
191. Id. at 1723 n.24 (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, before the
American Bar Association Uuly 9, 1985».
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tual foundation to support their premise. That position
inappropriately obviates the text by concluding that following the
Constitution's words leads to simple, myopic, inhibiting references to
an enacted law's words. '92 This position believes the Constitution's
broadly drafted clauses demonstrate the impossibility of textualism;
thus, it follows that courts should apply the principles embodied in
these phrases. '93 Similarly, this view proclaims no language is copious
enough to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as to exclude many equivocally denoting different ideas. '94
Therefore, differing views surrounding the vision of the Ninth
Amendment are each incomplete. The Ninth Amendment specifically authorizes constitutional evolution because its text provides that
the people retain unenumerated rights. Because the text of the
amendment issues this commandment, analytical development is a
text-based function of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. It is, in a
sense, the best of both worlds. The meaning of the words of the
amendment at issue are applied and adhered to, and the flexibility of
the amendment to apply to current legal disputes is sanctioned.

B.

The Judiciary's Role in Ninth Amendment Jurisprudence

The application of the Ninth Amendment to evaluate unenumerated rights claims is not judicial activism; conversely, it is judicial activism not to apply the Ninth Amendment. 195 Judges are responsible for
adjudicating competing claims of right between governments and individuals. '96 The Declaration of Independence expressed the expectation that all government bodies, including the members of the
judiciary, were to secure rights that were fundamental to all. 197 The
judiciary's action or inaction will directly affect the realization of fundamental human expectations. 198 The Ninth Amendment's
unenumerated, judicially unenforceable constitutional rights com192. Id. at 1724 (quoting ELY, supra note 144, at 34-41).
193. Id. at 1721 n.15.
194. Id. at 1721 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961».
195. Id. at 1723. "UJudicial restraint is but another form of judicial activism." Id.
at 1719 (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw iv
(1978». "By inference the language .of the Ninth Amendment also invites
the view that judges are authorized to protect rights that are not enumerated as well as ones that are enumerated." Haddon, supra note 166, at 93
(citing Barnett, supra note 182); Massey, supra note 166, at 312-13). Stephen Macedo argues that the Ninth Amendment calls upon judges to engage in principled judicial activism based upon sound moral thinking and
our political tradition. Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63,65 (1987)
(citing STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE CONSTITUTION 43 (The
Cato Institute 1986».
196. Morton, supra note 146, at 752.
197. Paust, supra note 166, at 235.
198. Id. at 235.
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mand the respect of governmental actors whose conduct could transgress them, and in the absence of judicial enforcement, those actors
would still be obliged to determine and respect these rights. 199
Bork argues that if judges were to determine unenumerated rights
issues, then the Founders would have placed that in the Ninth
Amendment's text. 200 Specifically, Bork concludes:
[I] t is inconceivable that men who viewed the judiciary as a
relatively insignificant branch could have devised, without
even discussing the matter, a system, known nowhere else on
earth, under which judges were given uncontrolled power to
override the decisions of the democratic branches by finding
authority outside the written Constitution. 201
That statement is textually inaccurate. The authority to override
the legislative and executive branches is found in the text of the Ninth
Amendment. The Ninth Amendment grants the people unenumerated rights. If the legislative and executive branches unconstitutionally abridge an unenumerated right, the judiciary has a duty to rule
the law unconstitutional. This form of power is controlled by what
unenumerated rights the people retain. A judge, following the letter
of the Ninth Amendment, can only recognize an unenumerated right
that the people have already retained. The judiciary cannot avoid its
responsibility for policy serving decision-making by simplistic notions
of noninvolvement, nor can it continue to ignore several rights of
mankind with a self-deceiving claim of unfamiliarity with fundamental
and continuous expectations that were not specifically enumerated
over 200 years ago. 202
Bork believes that if judges were to be given authority to determine
what rights the people retain, the Ninth Amendment would have said
199. Sager, supra note 56, at 252.
200. Allen, supra note 6, at 1662 (citing BORK, supra note 15, at 183); see also
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1508, 1517-18 (1994) (Allowing the judiciary to enforce unenumerated rights could inappropriately enlarge judicial power and discretion);
Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism:
Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual
Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 421 (1991) (noting that the Founders did not intend judges to declare legislation unconstitutional based on unwritten natural law and it is unclear whether they intended judges to declare
legislation unconstitutional to protect rights enumerated in the
Constitution) .
201. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 607 (quoting BaRK, supra note 15, at 185); see
also Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modern
Ninth Amendment's Spreading Confusion, 2 BYU L. REv. 351, 388 (1996) (stating that the Founders did not think it was acceptable for the judiciary to
recognize unenumerated rights).
202. Paust, supra note 166, at 235. An example of the judiciary's unfamiliarity
argument is Justice Jackson's statement that Ninth Amendment rights "are
still a mystery to me." Id. at 235 n.l4 (quoting ROBERT JACKSON, THE SuPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 75 (1955)).
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as much.203 He argues that the amendment could have been drafted
stating: "The courts shall determine what rights, in addition to those
enumerated here, are retained by the people," or "The American people ... delegate to their courts the task of determining what rights,
other than those enumerated here, are retained by the people."204
Does the text of the First Amendment state that the judiciary should
determine what is protected speech? Does the text of the Fourth
Amendment state that the judiciary should determine what is a constitutional search and seizure? Does the text of the Fifth Amendment
state that the judiciary should determine if due process of law has
been violated? Those rhetorical questions go on and on. In an esoteric sense, we can take constitutional interpretive questions to mindless settings. Someone could go as far as to say that the Con~titution
does not state that we should read it in order or from left to right.
How do we know how to read it then? In other words, common sense
has to enter the equation at some point. Here, common sense indicates that judicial enforcement is a necessary concomitant of a meaningful right, not an extra governmental power. 205 In the end, "the
rightness of judicial review for enumerated rights settles the issue of
the rightness of judicial review for unenumerated ones, because anything else would 'disparage' these latter rights."206
The legislative and executive branches have a role in unenumerated
rights issues. Legislatures generally can grant additional rights
through constitutional amendments, and the executive can enforce
them. However, that does not preclude a situation wherein a legislature passes a law unconstitutionally restricting an unenumerated
right, an executive signs it, and the court finds that the law is unconstitutional because it violates an unenumerated right under the Ninth
Amendment. When a violation of a vested right occurs, there exists a
legal remedy.207 A judicial review to determine if a law violates an
unenumerated right conveys legitimacy on legislation and, thus, legitimacy on the Constitution. 208 Critics of judges evaluating Ninth
203. BORK, supra note 15, at 183.
204. Id.
205. Sanders, supra note 3, at 793; see e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1169 (1987) (stating that legal
remedies exist for violations of rights).
206. Haddon, supra note 166, at 109 (citing Randy E. Barnett, FareUJard:
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 615,630-35,641-42 (1991)).
207. Jack Alan Levy, As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law ofFareign Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violatars, 86 GEO. LJ. 2703, 2728
(1998) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,162-63 (1803))
(stating that the right of individuals to claim protection of the laws when
she is injured is a primary duty of government); see also Virginia Coupon
Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) (noting that taking away the remedy enforcing a right "is to take away the right itself').
208. Randy E. Barnett, FareUJard: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 37, 64 (1988).
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Amendment issues must realize that judges are supposed to judge and that is constitutional.
Bork correctly notes that the Ninth Amendment is not a warrant for
judges to create constitutional rights not mentioned in the Constitution. 209 If a judge determines that an unenumerated right exists, however, that does not mean that she created a right. 210 Natural rights
exist independently of any form of government; thus, neither judges
nor anyone else can create them. 211 The text of the Ninth Amendment, legal materials, and traditions of debate all discipline and temper judges' moral judgments concerning justice and liberties. 212
Judges interpreting un enumerated rights issues will be "morally informed critics of the constitutional order, working within the limits of
fidelity to legal materials and professional norms to make their polity
the best it can be."213 Judges should look to the Constitution, as well
as natural law and the inherent rights of mankind, when determining
the validity of a statute. 214 Therefore, the judiciary cannot make a
blind pronouncement that an unenumerated right exists. That would
constitute the creation of an unenumerated right and could only be
constitutional if the Ninth Amendment said something like, in Bork's
words, "The courts shall create new rights as required by the principles of the republican form of government."215 In an unenumerated
right capacity, however, the judiciary acts when a valid legal issue is
brought before them. If they determine that a law violates an
unenumerated right, then that recognizes the existence of the
unenumerated right, it does not create one. It must have already existed for it to be protected by a Court evaluating the action or behavior in question at some later date.
If the judiciary does not determine unenumerated rights, then who
does? Congress was not granted the power to evaluate unenumerated
rights issues. 216 If only congressional self-restraint checked such a
power, then that would violate separation of powers and permit Con209. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
LJ. 1, 3 (1971).
210. Morton, supra note 146, at 752.
211. Id.
212. Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward A Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 29, 40 (1992).
213. Id. at 41.
214. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 611 (quoting Sherry, supra note 205, at 1145).
215. BORK, supra note 15, at 183. Justice Scalia also misconstrues a Ninth
Amendment jurisprudence sanctioning judges to recognize unenumerated
rights as a proposal for judges to create rights. ANTON IN SCALIA, A MAlTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 38 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1997).
216. Allen, supra note 6, at 1661-62. The Constitution also prohibits Congress
and the States from passing bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 3;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. 1. Bills of attainder are legislative acts "prescribing capital punishment, without a trial, for a person guilty of a high offense
such as treason or a felony." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 159 (7th ed. 1999).
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gress "to become [its own] 'constitutional judge."'217 The Ninth
Amendment's historical context was not designed to grant Congress
authority to create additional rights. 218 That power did not come, if
ever, until Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 219
Nor is the Ninth Amendment's reference to other rights retained by
the people an apt way of stating that Congress may create unenumerated rights. 220
State governments cannot protect a federal constitutional guarantee through statutes, common law, or state constitutionallaw. 221 This
leads us back to a very basic premise - the federal judiciary has the
power to determine if a law violates an unenumerated right protected
by the Ninth Amendment of the federal Constitution. For judges to
ignore it would be a violation of the Founders' express intent announced through the words of the Amendment. 222
C.

James Madison's Irrelevant Intent

James Madison is generally considered the sole author of the Ninth
Amendment. 223 Therefore, there is a scholarly temptation to determine what his vision was of the Ninth Amendment. Logically since
the amendment is the work of Madison, his explanation of its intent
and meaning should contro1. 224
However, any analysis of what legislators, even Madison, intended
the Ninth Amendment to mean is irrelevant to my position. 225
Whether the Constitution or a statute is interpreted, the original
meaning of the text is analyzed, and" 'not what the original draftsmen
intended.' "226 The law is what the law says; thus, we should be con-

217.
218.

219.
220.
221.
222.

223.
224.
225.
226.

This prohibition supports the constitutional ideal that the judiciary, not the
legislature, should adjudicate legal claims.
Burke, supra note 166, at 125 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961».
Allen, supra note 6, at 1662 (quoting ELY, supra note 144, at 37). "[T]here
is nothing about elected nonjudicial officials that qualifies them specially
to respond to the rights referenced by the [N]inth [A]mendment." Sager,
supra note 56, at 252 (referencing Laurence G. Sager, Rights Skepticism and
Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 417, 43641 (1981».
Allen, supra note 6, at 1662.
Id.
Id. at 1662 (citing ELY, supra note 144, at 37).
See Levinson, supra note 168, at 142. For Bork to state that "the set of enforceable constitutional rights is limited to those specified in text is ... to
defy the [N]inth [A]mendment by denying that there are other rights retained by the people and by disparaging the enterprise of searching for a
mode of analysis that might flesh out this admittedly otheIWise skeletal remainder." Id.
Niles, supra note 13, at 117.
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1721 n.16 (citing BENNETT PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN N1NTH AMENDMENT 18 (Bobbs-Merill 1955».
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia,j., concurring).
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Founh Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv.
547,740 n.555 (1999) (quoting SCALIA, supra note 215 at 38).
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tent with reading the law rather than psychoanalyzing its enactors. 227
The text is the key, therefore, we should ignore drafting history without discussing it, instead of after discussing it. 228 The views of Alexander Hamilton, a draftsperson, bear no more authority than the views
of Thomas Jefferson, not a draftsperson, with regard to the meaning
of the Constitution. 229 The thoughts of a draftsperson regarding what
rule he or she drafted meant does not change the meaning the rule
would otherwise bear. 230 Therefore, the views of James Madison
should bear no more authority than the views of anyone else associated with the drafting and ratifying of the Ninth Amendment.
Besides the fact that Madison's interpretation of the Ninth Amendment bears no authoritative weight, scholars come to conflicting conclusions regarding what he intended the Ninth Amendment to
mean. 231 Thus, even if Madison's views on the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment were relevant, they still would not shed light on the
amendment's meaning since his view is hotly contested. Some traditionalist scholars, who feel the Ninth Amendment only forever places
a line between the rights of the people and the powers of the government, maintain that Madison argued for judicial review of only enumerated rights. 232 Therefore, this position believes Madison intended
the Ninth Amendment to assure anti-federalists that the "Constitution
would leave intact those individual rights contained in state constitutions, statutes, and common law. "233 On the other hand, some affirmative rights advocates, who contend the Ninth Amendment recognizes
individual rights not listed in the first eight amendments, believe it is
unlikely Madison thought uneneumerated rights would be left entirely to the will of the legislature or the majority of the community,
with only enumerated rights receiving judicial protection. 234 Under
this model, Madison feared that unenumerated rights would be left
227. Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank, 516 U.S. 264,279 (1996) (Scalia,]., concurring) (citing United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295,
319 (1953) (Jackson,]., concurring)).
228. Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 283 (Scalia,]., concurring); see also Philip P.
Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in
Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REv. 199,205 n.31 (1999) (citing Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 n.t
(1998) (noting that Justice Scalia joins entire opinion except section discussing and rejecting a party's appeal to legislative history)); Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n. * (1997) (noting that Justice
Scalia joins entire opinion except footnote discussing and rejecting legislative history to construe a statute).
229. Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia,]., concurring).
230. Id. at 168.
23l. See Barnett, supra note 182 at 3; Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223, 260-61 (1983).
232. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 182, at 20.
233. Caplan, supra note 231, at 259.
234. Barnett, supra note 182, at 20.
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unprotected; thus, the Ninth Amendment was proposed and
adopted. 235
While I realize statutes, cases, and other materials will forever be
subject to differing interpretations, when a person's alleged intent behind drafting a constitutional amendment from over two hundred
years ago is in doubt, should we not take our medicine and concede
we do not know what Madison believed the Ninth Amendment to
mean? No scholar, to my knowledge, has any Madison source stating,
"I believe the Ninth Amendment means .... " Instead, intent based
scholars seem to rely on a grab bag of Madison's amendment proposals, letters, speeches, and writings with the hope of pulling it together
to effectuate his Ninth Amendment beliefs. 236 Once again, while I
admit referring to analogous sources to a legal issue is an appropriate
analytical tool, the situation here is different. There is no collective
principle at issue in which a Madisionian belief from similar arenas
can be applied to answer. Here, there is a curt constitutional amendment. Absent a direct quotation from Madison interpreting it, I find
it implausible to attempt to string together a panoply of his commentaries, over an unspecified time period, concerning multiple issues,
and then conclude, with certainty mind you, that Madison believed
this or that about the Ninth Amendment.
The best example of the limitations present when attempting to
utilize Madison's alleged intent behind the amendment is found in
writings by the leading affirmative rights Ninth Amendment scholar,
Randy E. Barnett. 237 Barnett feels it is appropriate to "rely heavily on
the explanation of constitutional rights provided by James Madison in
his speech before the House of Representatives."238 Barnett places almost complete interpretative control over the Ninth Amendment in
Madison's hands because Madison conceived the amendment and his
"conception of constitutional rights is the most pertinent to an understanding of the Ninth Amendment's intended function."239 Barnett
acknowledges the gap in his own theory by admitting that Madison's
speech to the House of Representatives mayor may not reflect a clear
consensus of Madison's contemporaries. 240 Even with that concession, Barnett still claims that "if a robust theory of the unenumerated
235. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1740.
236. See generally Part.lII.C.
237. Barnett has published and edited a number of pieces on the Ninth Amendment. See, eg., THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989); THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1993); Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amendmentjor Today's Constitution, 26 VAL. D.L. REv. 419 (1991); Randy E. Barnett,
Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1988).
238. Barnett, supra note 182, at 3.

239. [d.
240. [d.
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rights retained by the people is consistent with [Madison'sJ vision,
then it will be quite difficult to sustain an objection to such a theory
on the ground that it violates original intent."241 If Barnett admits
that one Madison speech on the Ninth Amendment may not carry the
day regarding the Ninth Amendment's intent, then how can he give
authoritative weight to a vision correlating to that speech? Barnett
could have created a more authoritative position, based on a concrete
textual foundation, with: "if a robust theory of the unenumerated
rights retained by the people is consistent with the text of the Ninth
Amendment, then it will be quite difficult to sustain an objection to
such a theory on the ground that it violates original intent." That
statement eliminates the shaky intent ground that Barnett currently
rests on. If you want a clear consensus of what Madison and his contemporaries thought the Ninth Amendment means, just look at what
they agreed upon - the words and wording of the amendment itself.
The Ninth Amendment's text is the best source to determine the clear
consensus of its meaning.
Scholars and judges who study Madison's intent also concede that
his work never went unquestioned. The Ninth Amendment was "almost entirely the work of James Madison."242 However, the first draft
of the Constitution drew criticism from representatives of the thirteen
states. 243 It has been noted that "[mJany in the state delegations to
the Constitutional Convention complained that the document did not
include a statement of the rights that individual citizens would enjoy
under the new government."244 Madison drafted the first ten amendments "[iJn an attempt to respond to those concerns"245 and he "was a
vocal opponent of the inclusion of a bill of rights until it became clear
the Constitution would not be ratified by the states without one."246
The Bill of Rights formed after a classic political compromise between
competing factions with complex, conflicting, and shifting attitudes
toward liberty and the community.247 If we are going to attempt to
discern the intent behind the Ninth Amendment, surely we must attempt to discern all persons' intentions that helped mold the amendment. Since this is impossible, I disavow it and do not consider the
Founders' (including Madison's) alleged intent behind the Ninth
Amendment.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See id.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89.
Niles, supra note 13, at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ll8 n.ll7.
JoEllen Lind, Liberty, Community, and the Ninth Amendment, 54
1259, 1288 (1993).
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Examining a prior draft of a Madison amendment shows that more
than just minor alterations were made to his proposa1. 248 Madison
proposed the following:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the [C]onstitution,
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed
as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by
the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
[C]onstitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution. 249
The above language was "split into two resolutions, which would
form the thematic basis for separate amendments."25o The Tenth
Amendment was formed stating, "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."251 Madison's
Ninth Amendment proposal stated, "[t]he enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."252 The only changes after that were
substituting a "[t]he" for the "this" and placing a comma after Constitution. 253 This, however, does not mean that Madison's proposal
made up 99.9% of the Ninth Amendment because "significant
changes were made in the language of the earliest proposals."254
Madison may have conceived the Ninth Amendment, but a House of
Representatives' Committee revised it. 255 Madison served on that
committee, but does that mean that the ideas, views, and overall input
of other committee members are irrelevant?256 Just look to Madison's
draft above that was divided into two separate amendments. 257 A severe change of that nature cannot be ignored even though the last
revision appears to be slight.
Scholars also unsurprisingly reach conflicting historical conclusions
surrounding the proposal and ratification of the Ninth Amendment.
248. See infra notes 249-257 and accompanying text. Drafting history is irrelevant and unauthoritative when interpreting subsequent legislation. See
supra notes 225-230 and accompanying text. Therefore, I ignore previous
drafts of legislation, including constitutional amendments, because the
only thing we definitely know about them is that they were rejected. In this
instance, though, I use Madison's prior draft of the Ninth Amendment for
a very limited purpose - rebutting the argument that we should follow
Madison's alleged intent behind it.
249. Niles, supra note 13, at 120.
250. [d.
251. U.S. CaNST. amend. X.
252. Niles, supra note 13, at 120 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789)).
253. [d. at 120-21.
254. [d. at 121 n.125.
255. Barnett, supra note 182, at 2.
256. [d.
257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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These conflicting conclusions create even more confusion regarding
the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. This is especially problematic
here because all facts and interpretations must be precise for anyone
to plausibly state what Madison thought about the Ninth Amendment
over two hundred years ago.
Incomplete facts, interpretations, and conclusions regarding the intent behind the Ninth Amendment are found in how the legislature
debated the amendment. One view states that there was almost no
debate in the House of Representatives concerning the Ninth Amendment258 before it was passed, and there was virtually no discussion of
either Madison's first proposal or the Select Committee's draft. 259
Barnett, on the other hand, does not categorize the level of debate in
the House of Representatives. 26o Even if the correct view is that little
debate occurred, what was that little debate about? Who said it? What
does it mean in reference to what the Ninth Amendment actually
means? Furthermore, differing views exist regarding the debate that
occurred in the Senate. While the appropriate view seems to be that
the amendment's treatment in the Senate is unknown because deliberations in that chamber were closed to the public,261 another view
contends that "[t]here was no further discussion of this amendment
in either the House or Senate."262 Which is it? If the debate in the
Senate was closed to the public, how could we accurately state that
there was no discussion of it in that body? This is precisely the type of
unknown information that causes me to hedge before adopting
Madison's alleged intent behind the Ninth Amendment. We are uncertain about the degree of debate in the House of Representatives
and the Senate, yet we are to lean on Madison's idea of the amendment, while excluding the views of others involved in its genesis,
evolution, and ratification. One person's views cannot supplant the
views of the entire House and Senate. 263
Obviously, the collective input of many persons from state representatives to state delegations influenced the drafting of the Ninth
Amendment, as "the Constitution was not written and ratified by a
single actor with clear motivations, but by many participants, most of
whom left little or no record of their intentions. "264 There were many
258.
259.
260.
261.

Niles, supra note 13, at 121 n.125.
Sherry, supra note 205, at 1164.
See Barnett, supra note 182, at 2.
Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REv.
627,632 (1956).
262. Sherry, supra note 205, at 1164.
263. For more conclusory statements about Madison's intent, which I find inappropriate, see Caplan, supra note 231, at 259. "Madison intended [the
Ninth Amendment] to assure the antifederalists that the Constitution
would leave intact those individual rights contained in the state constitutions, statutes, and common law." [d.
264. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1721.
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Founders in Congress and the ratifying assemblies, speaking at many
times. 265 However, usually nothing about their intent, vision or motivation behind the Ninth Amendment is included in an intent analysis.
Do their views count? Are they considered meaningless? There is no
reason to believe a consensus existed amongst the Founders regarding
what unenumerated rights meant, nor is there any reason to believe
that we could determine what that consensus was if it indeed existed. 266 Thus, the "relevant 'intent' [behind the Ninth Amendment]
may have been very general or nonexistent."267
Again, most, not all, of Madison's proposed amendments were ratified 268 and there were minor alterations made to his text. 269 Accordingly, should we not investigate the intention behind those who
declined a Madison amendment or caused an alteration in the language? Their input had to be significant if it led to declining an original proposal or changing the wording of subsequent amendment
proposals. A sufficient number of people were not comfortable with
an entire proposed Madison amendment or the text of an amendment subsequently adopted. 270 How then can we be comfortable with
Madison's intent behind the Ninth Amendment? If only his intent
counted, then why were alterations to his text made? Allowing
Madison totalitarian control over the Ninth Amendment's meaning is
troubling. 271 Allowing his alleged view behind the Ninth Amendment
to control its meaning discards numerous thoughts, opinions, conversations, concessions, and other human interactions during a dynamic
time period. Most of that information we are not privy to. Instead of
attempting to overemphasize what small portion of that information is
accessible, I err on the side of caution and disregard it. Therefore, I
ensure that all of the ideas surrounding the Ninth Amendment gain
recognition in the text that was affirmatively adopted. The consensus
of varying views surrounding what the Ninth Amendment means is
incorporated into one, unifying work - the text of the Ninth Amendment. The best means to fulfill the grandiose ideal of understanding
constitutional intent is to rely on the text agreed upon. Lawrence E.
Mitchell quoted Justice Story's view that:
265. Tribe, supra note 60, at 96.
266. See generally Lind, supra note 247. At worst it may be said that the Founders
intentions cannot be ascertained with finality; some thought one way and
some another, thus, it wiil never be entirely clear exactly where their decisive collective judgment came to rest. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1722 n.20
(quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15-16 (Irvington Pub. 1962)).
267. Tribe, supra note 60, at 96.
268. Niles, supra note 13, at 117, citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 252, at
630.
269. Niles, supra note 13, at 117.
270. See generally [d.
271. See Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 CEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1127 (1998).
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The Constitution was adopted by the people of the United
States. . . . In different states and in different conventions,
different and very opposite objections are known to have
prevailed; and might well be presumed to prevail. Opposite
interpretations, and different explanations of different provisions, may well be presumed to have been presented in different bodies .... And there can be no certainty, either that
the different state conventions in ratifying the
[C]onstitution, gave the same uniform interpretation to its
language, or that, even in a single state convention, the same
reasoning prevailed with a majority, much less with the
whole of the supporters of it.... It is not to be presumed,
that ... clauses [of the Constitution] were always understood
in the same sense, or had precisely the same extent of operation. . . . Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the
people. 272
Because nothing but the text was agreed upon; the text and not the
intent is the appropriate starting place for a constitutional analysis.
What originalists, or other intent based scholars, do not understand is
that the Constitution's text is· the best source of the Founder's intent.
By relying on certain persons' intentions, the original intent of the
Constitution is not found. Original intent of the select few who left a
semblance of their vision is found. The views of a precious few cannot
be considered the original intent behind the Constitution.

D.

Historical Understanding of the Ninth Amendment Through Natural
Law Principles

While the text of the Ninth Amendment is the correct starting place
for analyzing it, legal thought before its passage is relevant to its interpretation. Prior legal thought and theory illustrates the mode of
thought present at the Ninth Amendment's ratification. 273 At that
time, legal thought found its home in natural law principles. 274 Natural law is premised upon a theory that'" [r] ules of natural justice are
those which are universally recognized among civilized men.' "275 Natural law and natural rights refer to "infallibly delivered conclusions as

272. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1722 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 388-89 (1970) (emphasis added».
273. See generally Raoul Berger, Natural Law and Judicial Review: Reflections of an
Earthbound Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 5, 5 (1992) (quoting Frederick Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study, 1 COLUM. L. REv.
11, 30 (1901».
274. Id.
275. Id. at 5-14 (quoting Frederick Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature: A
Preliminary Study, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 11,30 (1901).
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to moral and metaphysical truths.,,276 Inanimate objects or human beings are to follow the laws essential to their nature. 277
Natural law has evolved as an interpretative mechanism, whereby
'" [t] raditional natural law is primarily and mainly an objective 'rule
and measure,' a binding order to, and independent of the human
will, while modem natural law tends to be primarily and mainly a series of 'rights,' of subjective claims originating in the human will.' "278
A natural right is "generally recognized by a significant portion of contemporary society as one inextricably connected with the inherent dignity of the individual."279
The existence of natural law and natural rights was restated by philosopher John Locke,280 "and passed into the general understanding
of the Framers."281 Many of the most well known Founders expressed
a belief in natural law principles. 282 Thus, it is clear that the Founders
276. Morton, supra note 146, at 724.
277. [d. at 716.
278. Berger, supra note 273, at 11 (quoting LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES vii-viii (Elisa M. Sinclair trans., 1963)).
279. Massey, supra note 166, at 331.
280. 12 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 413 (1998). John Locke (1632-1704)
was an English philosopher; his writings strongly influenced our Founding
Fathers. According to Locke, all people possessed certain natural rights
and duties including life, liberty and property. Locke believed that the
duty of the state was to ensure the rights of the people since government
can easily infringe on those rights. The justification for the state's existence
must be asserted by its ability to guard human rights better than individuals
acting on their own. [d.
281. Morton, supra note 146, at 716; see also Sanders, supra note 3, at 764 (citing
GORDAN S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBLIC, 1776-81, at
283 (1969) ("The Founders were, almost to a man, disciples of John
Locke.")).
282. Levy, supra note 207, at 2723. In 1775, Alexander Hamilton WTote '''the
sacred rights of mankind ... are written ... in the whole volume of human
nature ... and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.'" [d.
(quoting BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw 90-91 (1931) (quoting Alexander Hamilton)). In 1763, John Adams referred to "'the unalienable, indefeasible rights of men"'. [d.
(quoting JOHN ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS 440 (1951)). Adams told the people, "'[y]ou have rights antecedent to all earthly governments: rights that
cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws.'" Robert M. Hardaway,
ET AL., The Right to Die and the Ninth Amendment: Compassion and Dying After
Glucksberg and Vacco, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 313, 348-49 (1999) (quoting
PATTERSON, supra note 224, reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 6, at 108. In
1764, James Otis declared that human rights are derived from the law of
nations that '''are natural, inherent, and inseparable rights.''' Levy, supra
note 207, at 2723, (quoting Jordan]. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of
Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in
Domestic Courts, 10 MICH.]. INT'L L. 543, 549 (1989) (quoting James Otis)).
The Massachusetts Resolution of 1765 states '''there are certain essential
rights ... which are founded in the law of God and nature, and are the
common rights of mankind.'" [d. William Blackstone argued that despite
the fact that individuals were required to surrender a portion of their natural liberty in return for the advantages of society, they "retained certain
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believed in unwritten natural rights. 283 Because individual rights existed, they deserved judicial protection even if they were not contained in the Constitution's text. 284 Therefore, higher law, or natural
law, is "arguably the great founding principle of American constitutionalism."285 The social compact theory is the "philosophical background against which the Constitution was written."286 Locke
expressed that natural rights comprise life, liberty, and property. It is
no surprise that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or

283.

284.
285.
286.

fundamental rights that were not subject to government infringement."
Wachtler, supra note 166, at 599 (citing 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION
388 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 120-41 (1765)). Blackstone identified these
rights as "personal security, personal liberty, and personal property."
Wachtler, supra note 166, at 599-600 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra at 390-94).
Samuel Adams said, '" [a] mong the Natural Rights of the Colonists are
these[:] First a Right to Life; Secondly to Liberty; Thirdly to Property. ...
Every natural Right not expressly given up or from the nature of a Social
Compact necessarily ceded remains.'" Sanders, supra note 3, at 802 (quoting Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists 20 Nov. 1772, Writings 2:350-59,
in 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra at 394-95). ThomasJefferson said,
"'Locke's little book on Government is perfect as far as it goes. ", Niles,
supra note 13, at 109 n.73 (quoting MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS
AND THE NEW REpUBLICANISM 19 (1994)). James Wilson said, "'the law of
nature, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its operations and effects.'" Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional, 100 YALE LJ. 1073, 1082 (1991) (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 127 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)).
Suzanna Sherry, Textualism and Judgment, 66 CEO WASH. L. REv. 1148, 1151
(1998); see also Sherry, supra note 205, at 1146 ("[A] constitution was not
itself seen as positive, enacted law but rather as a declaration of first
principles.") .
Id.
David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to
Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 313, 326 (1992).
Kevin W. Saunders, Privacy and Social Contract: A Defense ofJudicial Activism in
Privacy Cases, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 811, 822 (1991) (citing Edward S. Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv.
149,383-98 (1928)); see also Haddon, supra note 166, at 103 ("Few would
dispute that at the time of the Constitution's framing and the discussion of
proposed amendments there was a general belief in natural law."); Levy,
supra note 207, at 2722 ("References to natural law as the source for inalienable rights of mankind were pervasive at the time immediately before
the Constitution's adoption."); Massey, supra note 166, at 314 (stating that
the Founders "relied upon natural law principles in formulating constitutional guarantees"); Rosen, supra note 282, at 1075 ("Virtually all commentators agree that the Framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights believed in
natural rights .... "); Saunders, supra at 822 n.78 (citing Randy E. Barnett,
Are Unenumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have? The Case of
Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 101,103-04 (1987)) (noting that the Founders were influenced by the Lockean philosophy of rights
first and government second). But see ELY, supra note 144, at 39 (stating that
natural law theory was not universally accepted by the Founders and was
probably not even the majority view at the time).
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property, without due process of law .... "287 An evaluation of natural
law and natural rights theory, therefore, provides persuasive historical
understanding surrounding the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
Stephen Macedo appropriately describes how natural law principles
attach to the Constitution with:
Natural law or "higher law" principles are not yanked from
the sky and slung onto constitutional hooks. Rather, an
open ended and complex document is read in a certain
spirit: in light of the principles that seem to underlie its specific phrases and larger structures, principles that help justify
the document's more specific aspects. Indeed, by interpreting the document in light of its underlying moral principles
we extend the document's meaning in a way that vindicates
the preamble's claim that the Constitution is meant to approximate justice and other basic moral goals. The point is
to read this document and the history of its interpretation as
best they can be, drawing out latent principles, understanding the whole as attempting to realize the preamble's ends of
justice, liberty, and the general welfare. 28
Natural rights theory can neither explain the text of the Ninth
Amendment nor show the intent behind it. The written Constitution
is the highest law of society,289 but that does not mean that there is no
room for principles of natural law. 290 Natural law shows us where the
Founders were coming from because "it is beyond serious dispute that
natural law principles colored the outlook of those who drafted the
Declaration of Independence and later the Constitution."291 Although the text of the Ninth Amendment governs unenumerated
287. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.... "); DEClARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of American principle that government does not bestow or grant rights upon the people, but that the people
are born with such rights - and that a government that seeks to suppress
these unalterable rights does so at its own peril." Robert E. Hirshon, Peace
and Freedom: As We "tnjoy the Benefits of Independence, We Should Reflect on its
Beginnings, 88 A.BA J. 8, 8 Uuly 2002); see also Niles, supra note 13, at 109
("Locke's political doctrine ... contains all the defining doctrines of the
American Declaration of Independence."); Rosen, supra note 282, at 1078
("[The Founders] of the Bill of Rights recognized the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence .... ").
288. Macedo, supra note 195, at 40.
289. Berger, supra note 273, at 26.
290. Id.; see also Massey, supra note 166, at 343 (noting that the Founders "conceived of both enumerated and unenumerated rights as consisting of positive and natural rights."); Pope, supra note 154, at 450 ("The Ninth
Amendment says, in effect, to look for guidance in the natural law.").
291. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 599 (citing 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION,
supra note 282, at 395-99).
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rights issues, it was based upon some prior principle. The Ninth
Amendment did not come out of thin air and the 1700's are nowhere
near the start of human existence. Accordingly, a historical understanding of the principles behind the Ninth Amendment provide support for interpreting it.
An examination of Ninth Amendment principles is important because natural law theorists presuppose that it is a basic moral and metaphysical truth "that all human beings possess natural rights."292
Rights and freedoms are ultimate values and the creation of a system
of laws necessarily involves curtailing these rights and restrictions on
human freedom. 293 Since people by nature are free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the
political power of another without consenting to it. 294 Therefore, any
governmental assertion of power must be justified by referring to its
pursuit of achieving the peace and security of its citizenry.295
One can at least make a strong case that unenumerated rights were
understood to derive from the natural rights doctrine. 296 The philosophical context in which the Constitution and the Ninth Amendment were written indicates that the rights retained in the Ninth
Amendment are natural rights. 297 Therefore, natural law's textual
home is the Ninth Amendment. 298 Consequently, the Ninth Amendment occupies a unique place in the law because it provides a positive
law basis for a natural rights theory.299 Bruce N. Morton explained
how the Ninth Amendment's text adopted natural rights law:
The meaning of [the Ninth Amendment] is not subject to
reasonable dispute. The key word is "retained." Human beings have rights which precede (temporally and logically)
292. Morton, supra note 166, at 719.
293. Id. at 728.
294. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT § 6
(Babbs-Merrill ed., 1952) (1690).
295. Id. at 73l.
296. Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights, Positivism and the Ninth Amendment: A Response to McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 327, 332 (1992).
297. Saunders, supra note 286, at 823 (citing PATI'ERSON, supra note 224, at 19
("The Ninth Amendment ... is a basic statement of the inherent natural
rights of the individual. ... "); see also Berger, supra note 200, at 1521 (citing
BARNETI', supra note 6, at 6 (stating that natural rights are identified with
the rights retained by the people in the Ninth Amendment); Massey, supra
note 166, at 322 ("[T]he Ninth Amendment was intended ... to serve as a
barrier to encroachment upon natural rights .... "); Sanders, supra note 3,
at 805 ("As a statement that ... natural rights ... are not to be abrogated,
the Ninth Amendment ... [is] a silent sentinel guarding liberties not otherwise named in the Constitution.").
298. Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U.
CIN. L. REv. 49, 50 (1992); see also Levy, supra note 207, at 2724 ("[T]he
entire corpus of jus cogens humanum norms is incorporated into the Constitution through the Ninth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
299. Hampton, supra note 166, at 367.
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those explicitly conferred by this Constitution; they are the
natural rights possessed by all human beings independently
of human fiat. Specific constitutional provisions do not, and
could not, affect these rights. 30o
The interplay between natural rights and constitutional rights is
reminiscent of the chicken and egg argument - which came first: natural rights or constitutional rights. Here, though, it is a little more
obvious: the Constitution was based on the idea that natural rights
existed. 30l Therefore, the Ninth Amendment ensures a description of
natural rights exists in the Constitution. It was, and remains, carefully
worded to prevent the sort of denial of rights that we see more and
more often. By enacting a mechanism to evaluate Ninth Amendment
unenumerated rights claims, the causal link between natural rights
theory adopted in the Ninth Amendment and its application to current (and future) legal issues will be complete. Thus, natural rights
principles effectuated through the Ninth Amendment will enshrine
natural rights to the people, thereby curtailing the denial of those very
rights.
These natural rights principles are not confined to the boundaries
of philosophy and theory. The principle that human beings retain
natural rights is a part of the law. Natural law rested at the foundation
of several early decisions of the Supreme Court, most notably when
the Court considered the rights of individuals. 302 In Calder v. Bull,303
retroactive civil laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 304 The
Court stated, '" [a] n act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law)
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
300. Morton, supra note 146, at 751. Morton stated:
[T]he presumption is not in favor of governmental authority, but
rather, against it. Because natural rights are presumed to have
been retained by the people unless a basis for their delegation to
the government can be specifically demonstrated, this theory
places substantial and general limitations on the power of government. Because the legislative power is exercised, in Locke's political theory, by a democratically elected majority, this limitation is,
ipso facto, upon the power of the democratically elected majority.
Id. at 731; see also Mayer, supra note 285, at 325 (citing David N. Mayer, The
jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 55 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1990)) (advocating judicial enforcement of the unwritten constitution through natural law based laissez-faire
constitutionalism) .
301. Morton, supra note 146, at 714.
302. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 611 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796)); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; see
also Hampton, supra note 166, at 351 (citing 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230) (noting that fundamental principles include the right to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety)).
303. 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386 (1798).
304. Id. at 393.
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considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.' "305 In Fletcher v.
Peck,306 the Court used the Contract Clause to invalidate a Georgia
statute that reclaimed lands previously granted by a bribed legislature. 307 The Court stated that the statute would also violate" 'the general principles which are common to our free institutions.' "308 In
Wilkinson v. Leland,309 Justice Story concluded:
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property
should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this
country would be warranted in assuming that the power to
violate and disregard them - a power so repugnant to the
common principles of justice and civil liberty - lurked
under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to
be implied from any general expressions of the will of the
people. 310
Natural law principles, while waning, extended to decisions in the
late Nineteenth Century. In Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,311
the Court conceded that there are rights in every free government
beyond the State's control that ensure the existence of the social compact and must be respected by the government. 312 The Court believed that the social compact limited government power. 313
Furthermore, it did not restrict itself to aspects of the social compact
found in the Constitution's text; instead, it argued in terms of theoretical principles. 314 This conveys a balance between the Constitution's
text and the natural law principles it was based upon. A wholly textual
vision of rights ignores the natural law principles creating the text itself. In Munn v. lllinois,315 the Court concluded that although a body
305. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY LJ. 967, 1001
(1993) (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388) (emphasis omitted). Yoo also
indicates that in Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), the Court
invalidated a Virginia law that dispossessed the Episcopal Church of land.
The Court felt the law was inconsistent with the right of citizens to the free
enjoyment of their property legally acquired. Id. at 1001; see also Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (Wilson,]., concurring) (the right of
an individual to sue another state was upheld and states, like individuals,
are bound by laws through compact); Marks, supra note 153, at 479 (citing
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,255 (1796) (Patterson,]., concurring)
(confiscating property in times of war is incompatible with principles of
justice and policy, moral sense, reason and natural equity».
306. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
307. Yoo, supra note 305, at 100l.
308. Id. at 1O0l.
309. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
310. Id. at 657.
31l. 87 U.S. (1 Wall.) 655 (1874).
312. Id. at 662-63.
313. Saunders, supra note 286, at 81B.
314. Id.
315. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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politic is a social compact wherein the whole people covenants with
each citizen that all shall be governed by laws for the common good, it
does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights that
are purely and exclusively private. 316 Once again the Court offered a
clear view that the legislature's power is limited under the social compact, and once again these limitations did not appear to be confined
to those in the Constitution's text. 317
Accordingly, the text of the Constitution is not an exclusive source
for determining the existence of unenumerated rights. The text is the
appropriate starting point and its meaning cannot be violated; however, an evaluation of the existence of unenumerated rights cannot be
forever entombed in the text of the Ninth Amendment. Supplementing the text with the natural law theory it was premised upon and
subsequent case law that applies those principles conforms to the text
and further explains the law, thereby strengthening the text. 31S Leaving the text without the foundation of natural rights could place its
meaning in jeopardy. A wholly textualist approach provides the weakest restraints on judges and is an inappropriate invitation to judicial
creativity because broadly phrased terms allow judges to utilize those
provisions however desired. 319 An active role for the judiciary in the
identification and articulation of unenumerated rights gives the Ninth
Amendment its literal meaning in light of the Founders' natural law
tradition: there are fundamental rights that exist outside the Constitution that deserve as much protection as enumerated rights. 320
Natural law also advances a form of legal thought ensuring that affirmative rights retained by the people are not unnecessarily, or in
current times, unconstitutionally infringed upon. 321 The major task
of jurisprudence is to continually assess legal restrictions to determine
when they exceed the permissible boundaries of tacit consent, and
infringe upon substantive natural rights, which are always retained by
the people and cannot be bargained away.322
This pronouncement builds on the theory of natural law and natural rights and mandates a form of jurisprudence ensuring the survival
of natural law and natural rights. In our system of government, this
commandment is essential because the judiciary determines whether
316. Id. at 124 (quoting the preamble to Part I, Article 12 of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts).
317. Saunders, supra note 286, at 818.
318. This does not mean that I agree (or disagree) with all the judicial decisions
based upon natural law principles. It means, however, that I agree with
courts invoking natural law principles in their analysis.
319. David A. Strauss, The New Textualism In Constitutional Law, 66 CEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1153, 1157 (1998).
320. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 610.
321. Morton, supra note 146, at 732.
322. Id. at 732. Since society is committed to government by consent, "society
must accept an active role for the judiciary." Saunders, supra note 286, at
813.
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an unenumerated right exists under the Constitution. 323 If the judiciary does not apply a legal analysis adopting natural law principles as
persuasive components in evaluating the law, the principles of natural
law will not be applied, but will remain as dormant philosophical
doctrines.
E.

The Correct Approach to Evaluate Unenumerated Rights Claims

Some may regard the Ninth Amendment as a recent discovery and
some may have forgotten it, but since 1791 it has been a basic part of
the Constitution that federal judges are sworn to uphold. 324 It is "a
uniquely central text in any attempt to take seriously the process of
construing the Constitution."325 Through the text of the Ninth
Amendment we can see that "the law is not static"326 and that "every
contingency that might threaten individual rights"327 was not foreseen
at the enactment of the Constitution. 328 This text-based commandment for progressive legal thought proclaims that the law of nature
will be progressive in its operation and effects; thus cotemporary society will evolve in the future to produce even better results. 329
The Ninth Amendment incorporates unenumerated rights into the
Constitution, directly protecting them from state action 330 through
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 331 The Ninth Amendment is not a rule of construction, but
rather a recognition of other rights 332 containing a "'fountain of
law.' "333 A reasonable interpretation of the Ninth Amendment includes the theory that it "could sanction an unlimited range" of
un enumerated rights. 334
The meaning of the Ninth Amendment may be clear, but its implications for constitutional adjudication are not. 335 The Ninth Amendment's text does not prescribe how to determine what unenumerated
rights are. Because the text does not enunciate a standard, we have to
323. See Wachtler, supra note 166, at 597.
324. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, j., concurring); see also U.S. CONST.
art. VI (requiring federal judges to take an oath or affirmation that they
uphold the Constitution).
325. Tribe, supra note 60, at 100.
326. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728.
327. [d.
328. !d.
329. WILSON, supra note 282, at 126-27.
330. See generally Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1731.
331. U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." !d.
332. Paust, supra note 166, at 254.
333. Caplan, supra note 231, at 226 (quoting CHARLES LUND BLACK, DECISION AcCORDING TO LAw 44 n.47 (1981».
334. Thapa, supra note 187, at 142.
335. Berger, supra note 200, at 1511 (citing BARNETT, supra note 6, at 4).
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develop some useful, text-based methodology to discover the actual
content of these rights. 336 At first glance, this appears to be a constitutional conundrum. In reality though, it is once again a brilliant portrayal of humbleness in the Constitution. If the Founders could not
determine what all the rights retained by the people were in the
1700's, how could they enunciate what legal standard to apply to evaluate unenumerated rights issues? Because no textual basis exists to
determine what an unenumerated right is, a test must be developed to
determine whether something is an unenumerated right within the
context of the Ninth Amendment.
To evaluate whether or not an alleged unenumerated right exists
under the Ninth Amendment, another dreaded three-part constitutional law test must be adopted. While I see law school students exasperating as they hear of another three-part constitutional law inquiry,
unfortunately there needs to be one here. It is as follows: First, is the
alleged right governed by any other provision of the Constitution? If
so, then that provision applies, the three-part test ends, and there is
no Ninth Amendment issue. 337 If no other portion of the Constitution governs the alleged right, then step two occurs. If step two applies, then the Court determines whether the alleged right was
considered a right retained by the people at the enactment of the
Constitution, or if it has evolved into a right that is currently retained
by the people. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that, at either time period, the people have not retained the right, then it is not
a right retained by the people. If at either point in history, however, a
preponderance of the evidence shows the right was retained by the
people, then it is considered an enumerated right. Under the third
step, the Court establishes a standard of review. A rational basis test
applies to a non-right, wherein the challenger has the burden of proving that the law in question is not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. 33B A strict scrutiny test applies to an unenumerated right, wherein the government has the burden of proving that
the law in question is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
interest. 339
Step one is a gatekeeper, which prevents a reviewing court from
spending any unnecessary time reviewing a non-Ninth Amendment
336. See generally Paust, supra note 166, at 235 (noting that the courts have a
responsibility to secure the rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment
through "rational and policy-serving judicial decision-making").
337. The first step of my analysis is similar to the first step in The Honorable
Robert W. Sweet & Edward A. Harris, just and Unjust Wars: The War on the
War on Drugs - Some Moral and Constitutional Dimensions of the War on Drugs,
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1302, 1361-62 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS SZASZ, OUR
RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (Praeger Publishers ed.,
1992)).
338. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
339. Id. at 721.
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claim. If another portion of the Constitution governs the legal question, then that portion of the Constitution applies. The only hurdle
in this step is resolving current precedent supporting substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, an argument can be made that if the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a
substantive due process component, then that provision should apply
to determine if an unenumerated right exists. While substantive due
process is current law, and deserves a good degree of stare decisis treatment, one need look no further then the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Ninth Amendment. If an unenumerated right is
alleged, then the Ninth Amendment clearly governs that question.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has its mandate - provide fair procedures when the state is attempting to deny
life, liberty, or property.340 Stare decisis is not an inexorable command
when interpreting the Constitution. 341 In constitutional cases, it is at
its weakest342 because it is always possible to appeal behind doctrinal
precedent in order to challenge current wisdom with what the Constitution's text commands. 343 While the doctrine of stare decisis demands
some special justification for a departure from longstanding precedent,344 we must remember that:
A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the
Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the
gloss which his predecessors have put on it. 345
340. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
341. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (citing State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997));
see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-08 (1932)
(Brandeis,]., dissenting) (stating that stare decisis is not a universal inexorable command).
342. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding l<-ra to
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 704 (1999) (quoting Agostini, 521
U.S at 235-38).
343. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 697 (1987).
344. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (citing U.S. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S.
843,856 (1996)).
345. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736
(1949)); see also Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV.].L. & PUB. POL'y 23, 29-30 (1994) (arguing that judicial power includes a structural inference that the Constitution is supreme over all competing sources of law); Lee, supra note 342, at 704 n.318 (citing Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,]., concurring) (stating that the only correct rule of decision is the "Constitution
itself and not what we have said about it"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217, 319
n.349 (1994) ("Uudges are bound to interpret the law as they understand
it], not as it has been understood by others.").
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In federal constitutional cases, where correction through legislative
action is practically impossible, the Supreme Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. 346 Essentially, the Court bows to the lessons
of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing the process of trial and error is appropriate in the judicial function. 347
Step two provides a court with a list of criteria to evaluate an
unenumerated right issue. Since fundamental rights are catalogued
in documents the American people have formally or informally ratified,348 an evaluation of an unenumerated right issue must look to this
diverse range of sources. This provides a more document-supported
approach that invites judges to canvass nonjudicial legal sources, state
and federal law, state constitutions, and other related sources for epistemic guidance. 349 The sources reflect society's view of the alleged
unenumerated right from before the beginning of our nation up to
the present time. They provide insight into the view of the alleged
right from the Constitution and all three branches of state and federal
government. The factors also increase the chance of recognizing the
right when a high level of liberty is denied by a law curtailing the
alleged right, while balancing that notion by decreasing the chance of
recognizing the right when it presents a substantial risk of harm to
others. The sources are not limited to government or legal items that
may exclude important and pertinent views of the behavior in question. The view of those most committed to analyzing the issue are
valued, as well as the view of the world community. The guiding principle upon which the Constitution was formed, natural law theory,
also provides insight as to whether the alleged right conforms with the
ideals upon which the Founders based our system of government.
Specifically, courts should look to the following sources to determine if an unenumerated right exists under the Ninth Amendment:
(l) does the alleged right fit within the overall structure and meaning
of the Bill of Rights; (2) what is the status of federal and state laws
governing the alleged right and related behavior; (3) what is the level
of enforcement of those laws; (4) what is the status of case law regarding the related behavior; (5) what is the level of liberty prohibited by
the law in question;350 (6) what is the level of potential social harm
346. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406.
347. [d.
348. Amar, supra note 59, at 123. While Amar discussed fundamental rights and
their protection under the Privileges and Immunties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, I believe the Ninth Amendment governs unenumerated rights and the Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporates those
rights against the states.
349. [d.
350. Marc C. Niles states that the appropriate question posed in Ninth Amendment adjudication should be "whether government action that places a significant burden on the expression of personal autonomy or freedom is
motivated by an unconstitutional interest in controlling private action or
private choices." Niles, supra note 13, at 124. An unenumerated right need
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prevented by the law in question;351 (7) what is the view of the behavior through scholarly sources and documents; (8) what is the world's
view of the behavior;352 and (9) whether the alleged right is consistent
with natural law principles.
The overall structure and meaning of the Constitution provides a
text-based standard to determine if the right at issue is similar enough
to other rights protected to warrant recognition as an unenumerated
right. Justice Thurgood Marshall explained a similar process of comparing non-constitutional interests to specific constitutional guarantees by determining that as the nexus between a specific constitutional
guarantee and a non-constitutional interest draws closer, the non-connot be a private action or choice to exist. The text of the amendment mentions nothing in regard to public versus private rights. The right of an instructor to teach foreign languages and of a student's parents to engage
them so as to instruct their child was protected by substantive due process.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922). The parents' decision may be
their private choice, but allowing an instructor to teach a topic to a group
of students in a public school is not a private right. Recent references to
the Ninth Amendment and enumerated or fundamental rights are not related to private rights. The Ninth Amendment supported a First Amendment right for the press to attend criminal trials, which are held before the
public in a public setting. Justice Douglas claimed there is an unenumerated right to pure air and water, and to vote in state elections. Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n. * (1974); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
233-34 (1971) (Douglas, j., dissenting). Those rights are available to the
public by public bodies, and are accessible in public settings. Moreover,
many enumerated rights are public in nature. See U.S. CONST. amend. I
(freedom to exercise religion, free speech, freedom of the press, right of
peaceful assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (accused receives public criminal trial). Accordingly, it is textually inaccurate to value only privacy oriented unenumerated rights, thus, I measure the level of liberty deprived by
a law, not the level of privacy deprived by a law.
351. Niles argues that private and public boundaries "should be viewed as conveying the distinction between acts that pose a potential public threat and
acts that do not." Niles, supra note 13, at 125. An unenumerated right can
exist and pose a public threat. For example, if the right to use contraceptives and the right to an abortion were granted under the Ninth Amendment, a potential harm (albeit extremely remote) could be the elimination
of the human population in the United States if all people use contraceptives and/or all pregnant women have abortions. Potential harms also derive from enumerated constitutional rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. I
(controversial free speech inciting negative reaction, division, or violence);
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (suppressing evidence may allow guilty persons to
go unpunished); U.S. CONST. amend. V (suppressing incriminating statements may allow guilty persons to go unpunished); U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(dismissing case for violating speedy trial rights may allow guilty persons to
go unpunished); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (granting bail may allow guilty
persons to go unpunished if they flee). Because unenumerated rights can
exist that pose a potential harm, I only weigh the level of potential harm
prevented as one component of my criteria. The risk of potential harm is
not dispositive regarding unenumerated rights issues.
352. See generally Murphy, supra note 166, at 481 (noting that the statements and
practices of the international community give status to a right that should
be protected from legislative encroachment by the United States' courts).
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stitutional interest becomes more fundamenta1. 353 Next, a review of
federal and state law announces the elected legislatures' view, shedding light on how people viewed the issue throughout history. The
enforcement of the law, however, may be the most telling factor.
Some old laws remain on the books even though they are rarely, if
ever, enforced. 354 This provides the most current example of the people's view of the law, as it shows whether the legislature is pushing for
enforcement, whether the executive is actually enforcing it, and how
the people are reacting to that enforcement. 355 As the law prohibits
more liberty, less deference should be given to the law. However, as
the law prevents more harm to others, less deference should be given
to the alleged right.
Finally, more deference should be given to the right if it conforms
with natural law principles, the theory upon which the Constitution
was grounded. This guarantees that the ideals creating the Constitution forever speak to the question of whether an unenumerated right
exists. Adjudicating unenumerated rights issues without reference to,
and persuasive support from natural law principles eliminate the very
thought process and logical deduction that established unenumerated
rights in the first place.
If an analysis of those factors shows our society recognized the alleged right as being fundamental in the late 1700's or it has been
subsequently recognized, and it is not a right that has been subsequently revoked by society, then it should be considered an
unenumerated right today. In other words, the action or behavior
may not have been sanctioned in the 1700's, but as society grew and
changed, it became accepted as a right retained by the people. This
ensures that today's legal issues are governed by today's attitudes. For
the Ninth Amendment does not prescribe that unenumerated rights
were forever determined in the 1700's: it does not say, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people at this time."356 The
"at this time" language is not present. Therefore, there is no text setting or limiting the time period when rights can form or be recognized. In fact, to place an arbitrary line in the sand fixing when
unenumerated rights can be recognized would be a clear-cut case of
judicial activism, in which a court would legislate a new provision into
the Ninth Amendment.
Step three provides the standard of review when evaluating an
unenumerated right issue. If the Ninth Amendment recognizes an
353. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
354. See generally Poe, 367 U.S. 497.
355. See generally Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Poe, 367 U.S. at
SOL

356. U.S.

CONST.

amend. IX.
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unenumerated right, it must be considered "fundamental," thus, warranting strict scrutiny review. The Ninth Amendment's text mandates
treatment of unspecified, unenumerated rights on par with enumerated rights. 357 The terms "inalienable" or "fundamental" are not
found in the first ten amendments when referring to a protected
right. 358 Why then would the Framers limit Ninth Amendment rights
to those that are not considered fundamental?359 A fair reading of
the Ninth Amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, leads
to the conclusion that all of the rights protected by the amendments
were considered fundamental when they were ratified. 360 Concluding
that unenumerated rights are deserving of protection only when they
are embraced by a social consensus relegates them to a distinctly lower
and more suspect status than enumerated rights - a status barely entitled to respect and not subject to full veneration. 361 If an enumerated
right is not recognized, courts will then apply the rational basis test to
review the law in question, giving tremendous deference to the law
and almost assuredly upholding it. This is standard practice now
when no showing of a fundamental right is proven. 362
My approach will not "open the Pandora's box of judicial review"363
or "provide 'a bottomless well in which the judiciary can dip for the
formation of undreamed of 'rights' in their limitless discretion."'364
These fears are halted at the door of this approach. By applying a
filter step first, I defer non-Ninth Amendment issues to their appropriate constitutional standard, thereby, limiting the number and type of
unenumerated rights claims. The second step sets forth a firm standard of determining whether or not unenumerated rights exist, which
binds lawyers and judges to similar principles. These principles will
now have added foundation and force because they will attach to the
amendment that formulated them, instead of an amendment establishing no such principles. This prevents a shifting form of jurisprudence wherein the standards and ideals governing the adjudication of
unenumerated rights are transferred to the procedural components
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When that
flawed transfer is prevented, a more structured and organized approach to determining unenumerated rights evolves because the analytical mechanism meets the confines of the Ninth Amendment.
Through that process, I am able to propose a more exacting methodology to govern unenumerated rights than is currently available in
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Massey, supra note 166, at 343.
Murphy, supra note 166, at 456.
Id.
Id.
Tribe, supra note 60, at 106.
See U.s. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 956 (7th Cir. 1998); King v. Edgar, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17999, *13 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
363. Barnett, supra note 182, at 22; see also Thapa, supra note 187, at 155.
364. Barnett, supra note 182, at 22 (quoting Berger, supra note 273, at 2).
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substantive due process jurisprudence. Accordingly, this approach decreases the chances of incorrect jurisprudence on both sides of the
unenumerated rights debate. My approach limits the ability of the
bench to ignore valid unenumerated rights, while at the same time
eliminating a vague pronouncement that would allow for judges to
grant unenumerated rights at a whim.
The cornerstone of this formulation rests with the even playing field
established in the second step of my analysis. By setting a preponderance of evidence standard, there is no presumption that an
unenumerated right exists, nor is there a presumption one does not
exist. To set a standard of proof above a preponderance of the evidence on the government to prove an unenumerated right does not
exist would fail to follow the text of the Ninth Amendment because it
does not indicate or infer that the particular unenumerated right at
issue exists. The amendment only states that there are other rights
retained by the people. 365 There is no presumption of liberty that
requires states to show that legislation infringing upon the citizen's
liberty was a necessary exercise of its police power. 366 The presumption of an un enumerated right "exalts the individual over the state,
contrary to the Founders' design."367 To place a burden on the government would give rights advocates an inappropriate head start no
matter how fruitful or fruitless their unenumerated right claim is. Because I do not give rights advocates a head start and a presumption
that the alleged unenumerated right exists, there is an affirmative
check on allowing for unending grants of unenumerated rights. On
the other hand, to set a standard of proof above a preponderance of
the evidence upon the individual challenger to prove an unenumerated right exists would fail to follow the text of the Ninth Amendment
as well. A citizen should not have to overcome any burden or proofbased obstacle favoring the government to validate an unenumerated
right. That would give non-text-based deference to the government
and presume, to some degree, before any analysis takes place that the
people do not retain the alleged unenumerated right. This flies in
the face of the Ninth Amendment. If the people retain the
unenumerated right, it is recognized. If the people do not retain it, it
will not be recognized. Any burden of proof aiding either government regulation or right recognition fails to meet the tenets of the
Ninth Amendment.

365. U.S. CONST amend. IX.
366. Berger, supra note 200, at 1509 (quoting BARNETT, supra note 6, at lO, 12).
367. [d.

222

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 32

IV.

INACCURACIES IN THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETING THE NINTH AMENDMENT

A.

The Traditional Approach's Theory

The traditional view of the Ninth Amendment ignores its text for a
conservative-based jurisprudence. Traditionalists argue that the Ninth
Amendment does not protect any substantive rights beyond those expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments. 368 This approach
argues that "[ t] he amendments to the Constitution proposed by the
several state conventions forbade an inference of extended powers
from specific limitations on powers. These proposals powerfully reinforce the conclusion that the mischief that Federalists feared was the
subversion of the scheme of enumerated powers and residual
rights."369 The traditional approach places an inappropriate reliance
on Madison's statement that "if a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the same
thing."37o That view contends that the Tenth Amendment, which
states, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people,"371 lends support, if not authoritative
weight, to their position. 372 The traditional approach proclaims that
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are two sides of the same coin,373
thereby forever placing a division between powers allotted to government and rights retained by the people. 374 The traditional approach
proposes that the Ninth Amendment's retained rights allude to the
368. Cooper, supra note 195; Phillip Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REv. 239, 315-17 (1989); Richard Kay, Adherence to Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 269-73 (1988); Thomas B. McAffee, The
Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights Retained l7y the People, 16 S.
ILL. U. LJ. 267 (1992); Siegel, supra note 177, at 533 (citing McAffee, supra
note 180); Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights, 26
AM. CRlM. L. REv. 1261, 1287-89, 1297-98, 1301-03 (1989).
369. McMfee, supra note 180, at 1277. Similarly, Earl Maltz said:
Admittedly, the amendment does seem to suggest that the
[F]ramers believed that people possessed rights other than those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. At the same time,
however, the language does not indicate that those rights were to
be protected by the Constitution, but rather from the remainder of
the Constitution.
Siegel, supra note 177, at 534 (quoting Earl Maltz, Unenumerated Rights and
Originalist Methodology, in BARNETT, supra note 6, at 265) (emphasis added).
370. Paust, supra note 166, at 244 (quoting James F. Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814, 822 n.36 (1966) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 431-32 (G. Hunt ed., 1904»).
371. U.S. CaNST. amend. X.
372. See generally McAffee, supra note 201, at 356-65.
373. Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1,3 (1987).
374. See McAffee, supra note 180, at 1307. This perspective believes the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments each secure the design of enumerated powers and
reserved rights and powers against the threats perceived to flow from listing
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people's collective and individual rights retained by virtue of the Constitution's grant of limited, enumerated powers to the federal government. 375 This surmises that it would be nonsensical to apply the
Ninth Amendment to the states because limits of the federal government's enumerated powers define the rights retained under the
amendment. 376 This leads the traditional approach to an abstract
conclusion that there are no affirmative unenumerated rights and
that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to reduce federal
power377 and "secure the rights reserved by the Constitution's enuexceptions to powers not granted and relying on implication rather than
express reservation. [d. See generally Berger, supra note 373.
375. Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REv. 17, 19 (1998) (citing Griswold, 381
U.S. at 519-20 (Black,]., dissenting)).
376. Cooper, supra note 195, at 76. Charles]. Cooper concluded the Ninth
Amendment expresses "that the federal government is one of delegated
powers, and that the enumeration of those powers is a guarantee that the
American people enjoy unenumerated, and therefore, innumerable, rights
against the federal government." [d. at 63-64; see also Slaughter, supra note
174, at 109-lO. This view proprosed "[t]he [N]inth [AJmendment was
drafted to ensure that the identification and protection of 'other' fundamental rights are to remain in the domain of state law, where they resided
under the Articles of Confederation." [d.
377. McAffee, supra note 375, at 26-27. Russell L. Caplan provided another
structural reading of the Ninth Amendment. He concluded:
It is ... incorrect ... to view the [N]inth [A]mendment as creating
rights that may be asserted against either a state or the federal government, because the amendment neither creates new rights nor
alters the status of pre-existing rights. Instead, it simply provides
that the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in
force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state
enactment, by federal preemption, or by a judicial determination
of unconstitutionality.
Caplan, supra note 231, at 228.
"Bork maintains that the Ninth Amendment 'appears to serve a parallel function by guaranteeing that the rights of the people specified already
in state constitutions were not cast in doubt by the fact that only a limited
set of rights was guaranteed by the federal charter.'" Pope, supra note 154,
at 449 (quoting BORK, supra note 15, at 185). The text of the Ninth Amendment quickly refutes Caplan's and Bork's premise. Nothing in the language of the amendment designates individual rights as being sustained, as
is, under state constitutions. A collective right or rights reading of the
Ninth Amendment also exists. Akhil Reed Amar determined:
[T]he most obvious and unalienable right underlying the Ninth
Amendment is the collective right of We the People to alter or
abolish government, through the distinctly American device of the
constitutional convention .
To see the Ninth as centrally about countermajoritarian individual
rights - such as privacy - is to engage in anachronism.
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1200
(1991).
Nothing in the language of the amendment points to a collective right
of the people to alter or abolish the government through the constitutional
convention. If that was to be the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, would

224

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 32

me rated powers scheme."378
When "interpreting the Constitution, 'real effect should be given to
all the words it uses.' "379 Therefore, it is inappropriate to state that
"[t]he Ninth Amendment was not intended to add anything to the
meaning of the remaining articles in the Constitution."380 To circumvent the clear meaning of the text, the traditional approach erroneously advocates placing the text "in its historical context"381 or
searching for "the meaning that would have been the most natural to
those who framed it."382 That position fails because it places one appropriate supporting doctrine, historical context, and one inappropriate mechanism, the Founders' intent, above and beyond the text.
As stated above, a consensus of the intent of all those involved in
drafting, debating, and ratifying the Ninth Amendment cannot be
found; thus, intent is excluded from the analysis. The traditional approach's Ninth Amendment text-skipping analysis argues that" [t]he
Constitution's proponents' belief that limited powers offered important security to the people does not imply that they would have agreed
to an open ended affirmative-rights provision to be enforced by the
courts."383 There is no need to examine what implication can be made
from a belief in a government of limited powers when analyzing the
Ninth Amendment. Implications and beliefs are unnecessary when
interpreting the plain meaning of the Ninth Amendment. The text of
the Ninth Amendment prevents denying or disparaging unenumerated rights retained by the people. Accordingly, the amendment contains an open-ended affirmative rights provision that renders
proposed beliefs on government structure and power to have neither

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

not language stating that proposition, or at least something remotely close
to it, have been chosen instead of the current text? Another approach suggests that additional unenumerated rights exist, "but ... that these rights
do not achieve constitutional status and are therefore not deserving of constitutional protection." Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728-29. Lawrence E.
Mitchell effectively rebutted that position:
This approach raises several troubling questions. How are these
enumerated rights insured against denial or disparagement?
Against whom, if not the government created and limited by the
Constitution, is protection against denial or disparagement
needed? And if these unenumerated rights lack constitutional status, why is it necessary to acknowledge them in the Constitution?
This approach ignores the first step in constitutional interpretation; it ignores the text.
[d. at 1729.
McAffee, supra note 201, at 380.
Barnett, supra note 182, at 2 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S at 491 (Goldberg,
J., concurring».
Thapa, supra note 187, at 152 n.80 (quoting EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL
OF RICHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 63-64 (1957».
McAffee, supra note 180, at 1225.
[d. at 1224.
McAffee, supra note 375, at 26 n.30.
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authoritative nor persuasive weight. 384 Historical understanding can
supplement legal methodology in order to understand the atmosphere and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Ninth
Amendment. 385 This study, however, cannot trump or obviate an
analysis of the plain meaning of the Ninth Amendment's text. History
only places that meaning in its proper act and scene. History is susceptible to varying interpretations, while the rather explicit text of the
Ninth Amendment is far less susceptible to varying interpretation.
The traditional approach also ignores that history is an ongoing
process. The Ninth Amendment did not apply to the states at its
adoption. 386 However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies it to the states. 387
Next, the traditional approach argues that affirmative rights proponents do not see the federal structure and a national government of
limited powers as an alternative, indirect way of securing liberty. 388
Although individual liberty can, and is, indirectly preserved through a
national government of limited powers, the direct protection of individual liberty through the unenumerated rights retained in the Ninth
Amendment is a necessity.
The traditional approach also claims that the first eight amendments of the United States Constitution limit federal power; thus, one
cannot read the Ninth Amendment to confer unlimited federal judicial power to create new rights. 389 This assessment is incorrect on
three fronts. First, the Ninth Amendment does not confer unlimited
federal judicial power because the text and principles of the Ninth
Amendment establish the boundaries of unenumerated rights claims.
The federal judiciary has the ability to determine if an unenumerated
right exists based upon whether the behavior in question was or is an
unenumerated right through the structure and principles set forth in
the analytical approach I described above. 39o Second, the Ninth
Amendment does not allow judges to create new rights - the text of the
Ninth Amendment states that the people already retain them. 391
Third, the first eight amendments limit federal power, as does the
Ninth Amendment, by preventing the government from denying or
disparaging unenumerated rights retained by the people. 392
If traditionalists are so concerned with a limited federal government and preserving individual liberty, then why do they resist an affirmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment that decreases
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Barnett, supra note 182, at 1.
McAffee, supra note 180, at 1225.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493; see also McAffee, supra note 201, at 350.
McAffee, supra note 375, at 25.
Berger, supra note 200, at 1510-11.
See supra Part III.E.
Morton, supra note 146, at 752.
U.S. CONST. amend. I-IX.
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federal power and prevents federal intrusion upon individual liberty?
Affirmative rights and federalism, in this context, are not mutually exclusive concepts. The Ninth Amendment authorizes a continual
check on federal power by ensuring that the people retain unenumerated rights. 393 The traditional analysis of the Ninth Amendment,
while posited at affirming liberty through the structure of limited federal powers, allows for a bigger federal government with large regulatory powers that directly encroaches upon individual liberty. This
leaves traditionalists susceptible to the same credibility criticism that
originalists receive regarding Ninth Amendment interpretation. 394
Traditionalists propose a Ninth Amendment interpretative theory,
based on limited federal power, which negates the Ninth Amendment's explicit command for decreased federal control and increases
the amount of federal power. 395 The traditionalist approach, therefore, appears to be a political, result-oriented doctrine that is truly
meant to limit individual autonomy under the Ninth Amendment
through a conservative jurisprudence.
If a traditionalist can only state that "the traditional reading of the
[N]inth [A]mendment has at least as compelling textual and doctrinal credentials as the doctrine of substantive due process,"396 she has
not established much of a foundation to support her premise.
Thomas A. McAffee,397 a leading proponent of the traditional view,
completes a thorough analysis, devoid of textual underpinnings, that
inaccurately emphasizes a historical understanding of the Ninth
Amendment. 39B He improperly relies on Madison's writings,
speeches, drafts, other Founders' statements, state proposals, and the
Tenth Amendment to reach his conclusion. 399 This legal paradigm
attempting to determine the meaning of the Ninth Amendment is inadequate because, as McAffee admits:
If the originalist does not justify historically his choice
among the historical options, his arguments will be completely un persuasive because they are logically defective:
without historical justification for his choice, his "use" of history is nothing but a normative conclusion decorated with
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See Saunders, supra note 286, at 818.
See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 389-92 and accompanying text.
McAffee, supra note 180, at 1315.
Thomas B. McAffee currently teaches American Legal History, First
Amendment Rights, and Constitutional Law at the Boyd School of Law.
Boyd School of Law Faculty Page, available at http://www.Law.unlv.edu/
faculty/facmcaffee_text.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003). He was previously a professor at Southern Illinois School of Law teaching similar subject
matter. Id. McAffee has published several articles in this subject area. Id. In
2000, his most recent book, Inherent Rights, the Written Constitution, and Papular Sovereignty-The Founders' Understanding was published.
398. See generally McAffee, supra note 180.
399. Id.
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quotations from the [F] ounders. If he denies or ignores the
existence of otherglausible historical viewpoints, he adds deception to fallacy. 0
Based on that backdrop, McAffee challenges affirmative rights proponents to:
either (1) show grounds for concluding that there is no connection between the state convention proposals and the ratification debates or Madison's drafting of the Ninth
Amendment, or (2) that at some point during the process of
drafting and revising the amendment, Madison or other
members of Congress altered their visions of the
amendment. 401
The easiest and most authoritative way to rebut this challenge is to
assert that it is improper to attempt to get inside the minds, actions,
and behaviors of proponents of state convention proposals, Madison,
or other members of Congress. As stated earlier, we do not know
what the overwhelming majority of persons involved in the adoption
of the Ninth Amendment believed its intent to be because "the Constitution was not written and ratified by a single actor with clear motivations, but by many participants, most of whom left little or no record
of their intentions."402 Because we do not know what many persons
believed the Ninth Amendment to mean, how can McAffee assert that
affirmative rights advocates must then show that Madison or other
members of Congress altered their vision of it? Even if we had a clear
consensus of what all persons believed the Ninth Amendment to
mean, the amendment's treatment in the House and Senate cannot
be determined. 403 Yet, McAffee wants the affirmative rights advocate
to superimpose herself in those debates to determine if any person
altered their vision of what the amendment would do, even though
the affirmative rights advocate most likely does not know what any
person's original vision was to begin with.
Furthermore, no textual basis exists for insisting that the Ninth
Amendment be read with the Tenth Amendment to conclude that the
Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights, and the historical
record on this point is inconclusive. 404 Moreover, we must remember
that debates separated the original text, which initially combined the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, into two separate amendments, with
two separate commandments. 405 However, the traditionalist approach
argues that '" [t] he [N] inth [A] mendment does not specify what
rights it protects other than by its reference to the enumerated powers
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 1277 (quoting Powell, supra note 343, at 689).
Id. at 1277-78.
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1721.
See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728.
See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
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of the federal government.' "406 Proponents of this view believe that
the Founders used the terms "rights" and "powers" interchangeably.407 This belief is incorrect, because it construes the Ninth Amendment to mean nothing more than what is stated in the Tenth
Amendment. 408 The Tenth Amendment speaks of reserved "powers,"
not "rights" - by contrast, the Ninth Amendment speaks only of
"rights", not of "powers."409 Recognizing that the people retain certain rights does not lead to a conclusion that the states retain certain
powers. 4IO Construing the Ninth Amendment as just another version
of the message set out in the Tenth Amendment would make the
drafting of the Ninth Amendment a meaningless exercise. 411 Traditionalists do not read the two amendments together; they erase the
text of the Ninth Amendment and replace it with the text of the
Tenth Amendment, leaving two duplicate amendments in the Constitution. Therefore, the traditionalists place the limited government,
reserved powers methodology that they prefer under the heading of
the Ninth Amendment, which essentially eliminates the Ninth
Amendment's true text and meaning.

B.

State Constitution Provisions Rebutting the Traditional Approach

State constitutions further verifY that the Ninth Amendment was
meant to ensure affirmative rights, not the federal government's structure of limited powers. The text and history of state constitutions verify the affirmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment because, as
Suzanna Sherry stated:
After the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, language similar
to the Ninth Amendment began appearing in state constitutions. Throughout the [N]ineteenth [C]entury, states drafting new constitutions included language mirroring the
Ninth Amendment's protection of unenumerated rights. It
is obvious that state constitutions do not need a provision
safeguarding federalism; the language thus must be interpreted in some other way.412
The existence of these Ninth Amendment analogues in state constitutions directly undermines the view that the Ninth Amendment is a
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Cooper, supra note 195, at 80.
McAffee, supra note 180, at 1247.
BARNETT, supra note 6, at 8.
Id.
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728.
Eric M. Axler, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People's Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 431, 467
(2000) (citing Massey, supra note 166, at 307).
412. Sherry, supra note 205, at 1151; see also Axler, supra note 411, at 467-68
("[S]tates have adopted language similar to the Ninth Amendment in their
own constitutions, and [thus], there is no reason to provide in a state constitution that the federal government is restricted to its limited powers.").
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rule of construction. 413 The presence of Ninth Amendment analogues in state constitutions shows an understanding that the amendment's language is a declaration in favor of rights against the
government. 414 Even an advocate of a traditional approach admits
that it is difficult to understand why any state would borrow a constitutional provision signifying that the federal government is of limited,
delegated powers that leaves the states with plenary power. 415
Thirty-two states currently have state constitutional provisions paralleling the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
the wording in these provisions is strikingly similar to the Ninth
Amendment. 416 Even a cursory review reveals that the Ninth Amendment is certainly the example on which these provisions were based.
The provisions also mirror the Ninth Amendment in regard to their
placement in state constitutions. Just as the Ninth Amendment is located towards the end of the Bill of Rights, the state constitutional
provisions are generally placed towards the end of a declaration or bill
of rights in the first article of the state constitutionY7 This positioning is significant because it suggests the amendment's role is as a reservations clause for unenumerated rights. 418 If these amendments
operated as rules of construction, then we would expect them to be
placed after the articles vesting the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. 419 The placement of state unenumerated rights provisions toward the end of a declaration of rights shows that these states believed
the Ninth Amendment preserved any rights that had not been previously enumerated in the Constitution. 420
These state constitutional provisions provide authoritative support
for an affirmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth
413. Yoo, supra note 305, at 1009.
414. Id.
415. Louis Karl Bonham, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State Constitutions, 63
TEX. L. REv. 1321,1331 (1985).
416. For a thorough treatment of the similarities between the states' constitutional provisions and the Ninth Amendment, see Yoo, supra note 305 and
Appendix I.
417. See generally Yoo, supra note 305, at 1010.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. See generally id. at 1013. New Jersey Constitution provides, "This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people." NJ. CONST. art. I, § 21. New Jersey entitles their
provision a "Savings clause." Id. The title further indicates that the provision saves other rights and privileges not enumerated in the New Jersey
Constitution. If the provision only meant that the enumeration of rights
and privileges were excepted out of state government intrusion, then the
provision could be entitled the "Structure clause" or the "Rights/Powers
clause." If the provision is meant to create a line in the sand between the
enumerated rights of the people and the areas in which state government
can operate, then there is nothing to save - all rights of the people and
powers of the state government are forever established, absent a state constitutional amendment.
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Amendment recognizes the existence of unenumerated rights. 421
The federal government cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon
these unenumerated rights, just as the federal government cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon enumerated rights. 422 State constitutional provisions paralleling the Ninth Amendment grant state
citizens unenumerated rights. State governments cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon them, just as state governments cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon enumerated rights. This interpretation of
the Ninth Amendment and its state counterparts follows the text of
the constitutional provisions and provides a logical, flowing methodology corroborating the balance of power between federal and state government. 423 The traditional view deletes and adds text to these
provisions and creates an illogical methodology wherein the Ninth
Amendment grants the states plenary power and the majority of states
redundandyannounce that same point in their own constitutions. 424
Kansas and Ohio's Ninth Amendment analogues defeat the traditional approach's conjunctive reading of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendment. They state, "[t]his enumeration of rights shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people; and all
powers, ... not herein delegated, remain with the people."425 That
text illustrates the distinction between rights and powers. If rights and
powers are interchangeable, and refer to essentially the same thing,
why do Kansas and Ohio feel the need to announce a rights provision
and a powers provision in their constitutions? The powers language,
coupled with the rights language, shows that the rights retained by the
people were different than the delegated powers. 426 Since rights and
powers provisions were both put within one amendment, they cannot
be interchangeable terms. If the text of the Ninth Amendment places
a line in the sand between protected rights and government power,
then why is the Tenth Amendment ratified as a separate amendment
regarding powers, not rights? Kansas and Ohio's constitutions display
how the traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment creates and
eliminates constitutional text not provided for in the language of the
421. Supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
422. Supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
423. Unfortunately, a large number of state judiciaries have also either ignored
their unenumerated rights constitutional provision or adopted an incorrect
interpretation of it. This publication is dedicated to the interpretation of
the federal Ninth Amendment, not its state counterparts. For a review of
how different states have interpreted their unenumerated rights provisions
throughout history see Louis Karl Bonham, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in
State Constitutions, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1321 (1985).
424. See supra note 412-15 and accompanying text.
425. KAN. CaNST. art. I, § 20; OHIO CaNST. art. I, § 20.
426. Yoo, supra note 305, at lO12-13. For a thorough review of Ohio's
unenumerated rights state constitutional history see supra note 425 at lOl113.
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Ninth Amendment by deleting rights language and inserting powers
language.
Four state constitutions, eight times less then the number of states
who adopt a Ninth Amendment like provision, contain language satisfying the traditional interpretation of the Ninth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 427 Kentucky's constitution provides, "[t]o
guard against transgression of the high powers which we have delegated, We Declare that everything in this Bill of Rights is excepted out
of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to this Constitution,
shall be void."428 Almost identically, the Texas constitution provides,
"[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this 'Bill of Rights' is excepted out
of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall
be void."429 Similarly, the North Dakota constitution provides, "[t]o
guard against transgression of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the
general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate."43o
Pennsylvania's constitution, virtually mirroring North Dakota's constitution, provides "[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers
which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is
excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever
remain inviolate."431
These provisions satisfy the traditional perspective. The plain language announces that everything in a state bill of rights is excepted
out of the powers of state government and shall forever remain inviolate. This language creates the traditionalist's perpetual line in the
sand between the rights of the people and the powers granted to the
state government. Under these state constitutions, there are no
unenumerated state rights available to the people. However, in reference to Ninth Amendment interpretation, these state constitutional
provisions show that when the people desire to create a traditional
approach to rights and powers they complete that goal through language fulfilling that proposition that is distinct from the language
contained in the Ninth Amendment, or the thirty-two state constitutions paralleling the Ninth Amendment.
The text of the Kentucky, Texas, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania
state constitution pronouncements would satisfy the traditional interpretation. These amendments provide that the government does not
have power over matters protected by a state bill of rights. These con427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

See supra notes 405-08 and infra notes 416 and Appendix 1.
Ky. CONST. § 26.
TEX. CaNST. art. I, § 29.
N.D. CaNST. art. I, § 20.
PA. CaNST. art. I, § 25.
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stitutions place a structural line between individual liberties protected
by a state bill of rights and the remaining powers of state government.
The constitutional text of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and
Texas does not indicate that the people retain unenumerated rights.
These state constitutional provisions are perfect examples of the
textually unsound traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Their text expresses that everything in the
state bill of rights is excepted out of the general powers of state government; thus, there is no reference to other rights outside those enumerated in a state bill of rights.
The Ninth Amendment has an entirely different text and meaning
when it reads, "[t]he enumeration in this Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people."432 The text of the amendment clearly indicates that the
people retain other rights. Obviously, these other rights must be
outside the Bill of Rights if they are not enumerated within them. Accordingly, the text of the Ninth Amendment cannot be read as a structural statement allotting the people a sealed set of protections in the
Bill of Rights. If the Founders wanted to close the number and
amount of rights of the people, they would have adopted text reflecting that meaning. The traditional state constitution provisions are
perfect examples of that kind of text, which is completely different
from the text of the Ninth Amendment.
Fourteen states do not have a constitutional provision adopting language mirroring the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution or the traditional approach. 433 Those state constitutions' are
silent on this issue. However, because the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Ninth Amendment
to the states, those states cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon an
unenumerated federal constitutional right.
V.

CONCLUSION

An objective reading of the Ninth Amendment should lead to an
almost universal conclusion - unenumerated rights exist outside those
enumerated in the Constitution. But it is amazing how the legal community creates complex issues. Instead of following the Ninth
Amendment's text, the United States Supreme Court created the substantive due process tall-tale, and it continues to this day. As we move
forward with this legal lie, the law's nose grows and grows. It keeps
trying to cover its tracks with more and more fibs. But the law's conscience suffers with each fib. If the United States Supreme Court
432. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
433. CONN. CONST.; DEL. CONST.; IND. CONST.; MAss. CONST.; MINN. CONST.; Mo.
CONST.; N.H. CONST.; N.Y. CONST.; S.C. CONST.; S.D. CONST.; TENN. CONST. ;
VT. CONST. ; W. VA. CONST.; WIse. CONST.
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comes clean, admits its substantive due process fabrication and revitalizes the Ninth Amendment, a great burden will be removed from its
shoulders. The Court would then follow the text of the Ninth Amendment as the constitutional provision to determine unenumerated
rights, thereby ending substantive due process's weak construction
and ever changing standards and boundaries. Furthermore, this common sense idea of following the Ninth Amendment's language would
lead the Court to apply the Ninth Amendment (and the entire Bill of
Rights) to the states because no state can abridge the privileges and
immunities of its citizens; thus, eliminating the unpredictable and inconsistent incorporation doctrine. By following the Ninth Amendment's text, and placing political and personal views aside, two nontextual doctrines are killed with one stone.
Consequently, a rare opportunity arises - a modern day chance to
establish a clear, text-based jurisprudence. This is first accomplished
by filtering out non-Ninth Amendment claims from any Ninth
Amendment analysis. Then an adjudication of an unenumerated
right claim should follow the encompassing views of the Constitution;
state, federal, and world governments; experts in the particular field;
and the natural law principles our nation's Founders believed. If the
alleged right exists, government intrusion upon the right will be extremely limited. This creates a clear legal paradigm where we must
start and adhere to the Ninth Amendment's text; recognize valid
unenumerated rights through an evaluation of the alleged rights
throughout history; allow the judiciary to determine when an
un enumerated right has been unconstitutionally abridged; and resist
the devilish temptation to follow James Madison's alleged intent behind the amendment. When that occurs, the Ninth Amendment will
be revitalized and substantive due process will cease and desist.
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APPENDIX I
The state provisions are as follows: ALABAMA STATES: "That this enumeration of certain rights shall not impair or deny others retained by
the people .... " ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36; ALAsKA STATES: "The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not impair or deny others
retained by the people." ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 21; ARIZONA STATES:
"The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny others retained by the people." ARIz. CONST. art. 2,
§ 33; ARKANSAS STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people and to
guard against any encroachments on the rights herein retained .... "
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 29; CALIFORNIA STATES: "This declaration of
rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; COLORADO STATES: "The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people." COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 28; FLORIDA STATES: "The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by
the people." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; GEORGIA STATES: "The enumeration of rights herein contained as a part of this Constitution shall not
be construed to deny to the people any inherent rights which they
may have hitherto enjoyed." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 28; HAWAII
STATES: "The enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." HAw. CONST.
art. I, § 22; IDAHO STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 21; ILLINOIS STATES: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the individual citizens of the State." ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 24; IOWA STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people." IOWA
CONST. art. I, § 25; KANSAS STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people; and
all powers not herein delegated remain with the people." KAN.
CONST. art. I, § 20; LOUISIANA STATES: "The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights retained by the individual citizens of the state." LA. CONST. art. I, § 24;
MAINE STATES: "The enumeration of certain rights shall not impair nor
deny others retained by the people." ME. CONST. art. I, § 24; MARYLAND STATES: "This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to
impair or deny others retained by the People." MD. CONST. art. 45;
MICHIGAN STATES: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 1.1(23); MISSISSIPPI STATES: "The
enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to
deny and impair others retained by, and inherent in, the people."
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MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32; MONTANA STATES: "The enumeration in this
constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair,
or disparage others retained by the people." MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 34; NEBRASKA STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people, and all powers not herein delegated, remain with the people." NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 26; NEVADA STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." NEV. CONST.
art. I, § 20; NEW JERSEY STATES: "This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people." NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 21; NEW MEXICO STATES: "The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people." N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 23; NORTH CAROLINA STATES: "The enumeration of
rights in this Article shall not be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36; OHIO STATES: "This
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people; and all powers, not herein delegated, remain
with the people." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 20; OKLAHOMA STATES: "The
enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people."
OKlA. CONST. art. II, § 33; OREGON STATES: "This enumeration of
rights, and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people." OR. CONST. art. I, § 33; RHODE ISLAND
STATES: "The enumeration of the foregoing rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." R.I. CONST.
art II, § 24; UTAH STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 25; VIRGINIA STATES: "The rights enumerated in this
Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people
not therein expressed." VA. CONST. art I, § 17; WASHINGTON STATES:
"The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny others retained by the people. " WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 30; and WYOMING STATES: "The enumeration in this constitution,
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, or disparage
others retained by the people." WYo. CONST. art. I, § 36.

